Abstract
In a paper in this journal, I (Erkenntnis 78:847–867, 2013) defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn (Erkenntnis 79:1355–1365, 2014) raises a number of objections against my arguments. In this reply, I argue that Littlejohn’s objections are unsuccessful.
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Notes
The debate concerns the epistemic (broadly-construed) norms for assertion. All parties agree that there are cases in which one may assert a proposition, relative to the relevant epistemic norm, but should not do so, relative to, say, morality or etiquette.
Littlejohn formulates the truth norm as follows: One must not assert that p unless p (i.e., one may assert that p only if p). It is consistent with this formulation that one may not assert that p (full stop), irrespective of whether it is true or, for that matter, known that p.
Reasons, on this account, are a subset of warrants.
Littlejohn claims that ‘the notion of a warrant is not a contributory notion, but an overall one’ (2014: 1359). I do not see why we should think this but the issue does not bear on what follows. In the remainder, when I talk of what there is warrant to assert, I mean what there is overall warrant to assert.
Critics also argue that truth is not necessary for there to be warrant to assert a proposition (see Lackey 2007). Since Littlejohn and I are concerned with the clash between TN and KN, and since both entail that one may assert that p only if p, I shall set this issue aside for another occasion.
Littlejohn notes that Fantl and McGrath (2009) and Schroeder (2011) argue that one can have that p as a reason for doing something even though one does not know that p. That is right. But they do not argue that one can have the fact that p as a reason for doing something if one does not know that p. It is the latter claim I rely on in my defence of TN. Since Littlejohn sets this issue aside, I shall do the same.
The background thought here is that, if you ought not to perform a certain act unless some condition obtains, and you perform that act in ignorance of whether the condition obtains, you are in that respect criticisable (e.g., as reckless), even if the relevant condition happens to obtain. There is, of course, more to say here but this is not the part of the account Littlejohn challenges.
Appealing to contexts of advice is a common strategy in arguing for the view that what one ought to do (hence, what one may do) is determined by the facts, as opposed to one’s epistemic situation (cf. Thomson 2008: 187ff). The point here is that contexts of advice support the view that a warrant or reason can exist without a person having that warrant or reason in the relevant sense.
Parallel remarks apply to Littlejohn’s discussion of prohibitions (2014: 1360).
Assuming that, if I know M, I know each of its conjuncts.
As it happens, I float such a constraint in the original article (2013: n32).
Making this move would require revising TN, specifically, restricting it to non-Moorean propositions. But, as discussed, there is an explanation for this restriction.
For further critical discussion, see McGlynn 2014: 108–109.
References
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Littlejohn, C. (2014). Know your rights: On warranted assertion and truth. Erkenntnis, 79, 1355–1365.
McGlynn, A. (2014). Knowledge first? Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Schroeder, M. (2011). What does it take to ‘have’ a reason? In A. Reisner & A. Steglich-Petersen (Eds.), Reasons for belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for funding which supported the writing of this paper (AH/K008188/1). Thanks also to Clayton Littlejohn, Conor McHugh, Lee Walters, and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier versions.
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Whiting, D. Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn. Erkenn 80, 1245–1253 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9722-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9722-5