Abstract
It is widely held that the meaning of certain types of terms, such as natural kind terms, is individuated externalistically, in terms of the individual’s external environment. Recently a more radical thesis has emerged, a thesis we dub ‘a posteriori semantics.’ The suggestion is that not only does a term’s meaning depend on the external environment, but so does its semantics. One motivation for this is the aim to account for cases where a putative natural kind term fails to pick out a natural kind: The term may have a standard externalist semantics (if it picks out a natural kind) or a more descriptivist one (if it does not). Knowing which semantics applies will therefore require detailed empirical knowledge. This move has also been employed in cases where a singular term, such as a name, fails to have a reference. We argue that a posteriori semantics is inherently implausible, since the type of semantics common terms should be given ought not to be conditional on details of chemistry or physics. A number of difficulties for the position—‘metaphysical,’ epistemological, and methodological—are articulated. Finally, we suggest that a posteriori semantics misconstrues the way in which semantics is empirical.
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Notes
For this construal see for instance Boghossian (1997), Brown (2004) and McKinsey (1991). For a more traditional characterization see Boghossian and Peacocke (2000): “An a priori proposition is one which can be known to be true without any justification from the character of the subject’s experience.” (p. 1)
For a discussion of apriority and fallibility see Boghossian and Peacocke (2000, pp. 4–5).
See Stalnaker (1997, pp. 535–536) for a good discussion of the distinction between descriptive semantics (a theory assigning semantic values to expressions) and ‘foundational semantics’ (a theory concerning what the facts are that determine that an expression has a certain semantic value).
See McKinsey (1987).
Kripke (1980).
For instance, despite being a renowned externalist Burge claims to subscribe to a more or less Fregean account of semantic value (Burge 1979). Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting this clarification.
The argument, recall, is directed against the idea that a thought content can be both object-dependent and knowable a priori, and the compatibilist replies that it relies on the false presupposition that it can be known a priori whether a thought has an object-dependent content.
Putnam (1975, p. 231).
This is not the only way of characterizing natural kinds and, arguably, not the best. It is, however, the characterization standardly given by externalists and it is the one relied on by Kripke and Putnam. For more details, see Häggqvist (2005).
As often noticed, the hypothesis may fail in a more radical way, since not only may it be the case that there is no one underlying property uniting the kind, but a motley, there may be no such kind at all around—phlogiston being one famous example, Boghossian’s Dry Earth another, more outlandish, one. (Boghossian 1996)
See Wikforss and Häggqvist (2006) for a defense of the cluster theory for natural kind terms.
This is discussed in more detail in Wikforss (2005).
Jessica Brown calls this ‘the illusion view’: ‘the term fails to express any concept at all, and the subject suffers an illusion of thought.’ (2004, p. 279)
Ludlow (2003).
Ludlow (2003, p. 407).
Of course, as one referee points out, Russell is in a certain sense not a descriptivist (Ludlow makes this clear too), since he construes logically proper names as referring directly (Russell 1918). However, he does endorse descriptivism in the case of ordinary names in natural language.
Similar ideas are presented in McLaughlin and Tye (1998). Whether a thought is a singular, object-dependent thought, they suggest, depends on external factors. For instance, whether ‘Cicero is an orator’ expresses an object-dependent thought, depends on whether the concept of Cicero in fact is a singular concept and this, in turn, depends on whether Cicero actually exists. They write: “If one‘s thought that Cicero is an orator is an object-dependent thought, that is an a posteriori fact about it. One can know a priori that one is thinking that Cicero is an orator. What one cannot know a priori is that one’s thought that Cicero is an orator is a singular thought.”(1998, p. 299) See also Brown (2004, pp. 294–295), and Nuccetelli (2003, p. 175).
Ludlow (2003, p. 408).
There is some reason to be wary here, though, in particular when it comes to the reductio argument. See for instance McKinsey (2002), for a criticism of the attempt made by McLaughlin and Tye to avoid the reductio by employing a posteriori semantics.
Ludlow (2003, p. 405).
Ludlow (2003, p. 409).
Boghossian (1997, p. 165). The same point was made (in discussion) by Barry Smith. It is clear that Boghossian construes this notion of a term ‘aiming to express a natural kind concept’ in terms of the speaker’s intentions. Thus, he writes, we are not asking whether the word actually names a natural kind, “but only whether its user intends it to do so.” (ibid., p. 168) It should be stressed, however, that Boghossian does not endorse a posteriori semantics and argues against the proposal that if ‘water’ fails to pick out a natural kind the externalist can fall back on descriptivism.
I may even firmly believe that ‘water’ does not have such a semantics, or that ‘Socrates’ cannot be given a descriptivist account, and be wrong. Brown makes this point in a discussion of the position we have labeled a posteriori semantics. Were the question to arise, Brown writes, the individual “would deny that she is having a descriptive thought.” (Brown 2004, p. 294)
This was pointed out by a referee.
Indeed, we know rather more than is strictly consistent with the usual externalist claims about “the molecular structure of water”, for instance; cf. Needham (2000).
A similar worry applies in the case of singular terms, of course. Kripke appeals to modal intuitions as evidence for his thesis that names are rigid designators. According to a posteriori semantics, however, intuitions cannot play this role. Rather, it is taken to be a definitional truth about names that they are rigid designators, and the role of intuitions, if any, would be as evidence that a term is a name.
This is stressed by Gertler (2004). She considers the proposal that the dependency of the concept water on the existence of water is only a posteriori but rejects it on the grounds that it is “at odds with the methods used to establish externalism.” (p. 46)
Ludlow (2003, p. 412). Of course, this assumes that ‘‘teacher of Plato’ is part of the would-be description.
Ludlow (2003, p. 411).
Ludlow does not pursue these issues further, but simply suggest that they are “theory-internal worries that the externalist about logical form must face” (ibid., p. 409). However, we submit, a semantic theory that generates difficulties accounting for our ordinary, intuitive, logical and conceptual inferences, has more than merely ‘internal’ worries (whatever that means).
This is discussed in Wikforss and Häggqvist (2006).
See Wikforss (2006) for more extended discussion of this point.
Boghossian (1997) makes a related point against the alleged apriority of ‘I have a toothache.’
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Acknowledgements
We wish to thank two anonymous referees for valuable suggestions, as well as the participants in the workshop “Context and Content”, Stockholm University, May 2005.
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Häggqvist, S., Wikforss, Å. Externalism and a posteriori semantics. Erkenn 67, 373–386 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-007-9051-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-007-9051-4