Abstract
Bayesian probability is normally defined over a fixed language or eventspace. But in practice language is susceptible to change, and thequestion naturally arises as to how Bayesian degrees of belief shouldchange as language changes. I argue here that this question poses aserious challenge to Bayesianism. The Bayesian may be able to meet thischallenge however, and I outline a practical method for changing degreesof belief over changes in finite propositional languages.
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Williamson, J. Bayesianism and Language Change. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12, 53–97 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021128011190
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021128011190