Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Conversation and conditionals

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

I outline and motivate a way of implementing a closest world theory of indicatives, appealing to Stalnaker’s framework of open conversational possibilities. Stalnakerian conversational dynamics helps us resolve two outstanding puzzles for a such a theory of indicative conditionals. The first puzzle—concerning so-called ‘reverse Sobel sequences’—can be resolved by conversation dynamics in a theory-neutral way: the explanation works as much for Lewisian counterfactuals as for the account of indicatives developed here. Resolving the second puzzle, by contrast, relies on the interplay between the particular theory of indicative conditionals developed here and Stalnakerian dynamics. The upshot is an attractive resolution of the so-called “Gibbard phenomenon” for indicative conditionals.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Adams, E. W. (1975) The logic of conditionals. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennett, J. (2003) A philosophical guide to conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edgington, D. (1995) On conditionals. Mind, 104, 235–329.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Edgington, D. (1997) Truth, objectivity, counterfactuals and Gibbard. Mind, 106, 107–116.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gibbard, A. (1980) Two recent theories of conditionals. In W. Harper, R. Stalnaker, & G. Pearce (Eds.), Ifs: Conditionals, belief, decision, chance and time. The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gillies, T. (ms. 2005). Counterfactual scorekeeping.

  • Lewis, D. K. (1973a) Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. K. (1973b) Counterfactuals and comparitive possibility. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2, 418–446. Reprinted with postscripts in Lewis, Philosophical Papers vol. II (Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 3–31.

  • Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow. Noûs, 13, 455–476. Reprinted with postscript in Lewis, Philosophical Papers II (Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 32–51. Also reprinted in Jackson (Ed.), Conditionals (Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 46–76.

  • Lycan, W. G. (2001) Real conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morton, A. (1997) Can Edgington Gibbard counterfactuals? Mind, 106, 101–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nolan, D. (2003) Defending a possible-worlds account of indicative conditionals. Philosophical Studies, 116, 215–269.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nolan, D. (ms. 2004). Is Stalnaker inconsistent about the indicative conditional?.

  • Stalnaker, R. (1975). Indicative conditionals. Philosophia, 5. Reprinted in Stalnaker, Context and Content (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Also reprinted in Jackson (Ed.) Conditionals (Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 136–154.

  • Stalnaker, R. (1978). Assertion. Syntax and Semantics, 9, 315–332. Reprinted in Stalnaker, Context and Content (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999), pp.78–95.

  • Stalnaker, R. (1984) Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Swanson, E. (ms. December 2005). Something ‘might’ might mean.

  • von Fintel, K. (2001). Counterfactuals in a dynamic context. In M. Kenstowicz (Ed.), Ken Hale: A life in language. MIT Press.

  • Weatherson, B. (2001). Indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Philosophical Studies, 51, 200.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Ross Cameron, George Darby, Andy McGonigal and Daniel Nolan for discussion of this material. This paper was stimulated by thinking through the Gibbard phenomenon with students from my class on conditionals at the University of Leeds in 2006. Thanks to all involved.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds, West Yorks, LS2 9JT, UK

    J. Robert G. Williams

Authors
  1. J. Robert G. Williams
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to J. Robert G. Williams.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Williams, J.R.G. Conversation and conditionals. Philos Stud 138, 211–223 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9032-5

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9032-5

Keywords

Search

Navigation