Function and organization: comparing the mechanisms of protein synthesis and natural selection
Section snippets
Introduction: the problem
There has been great progress in understanding mechanistic explanations in particular domains, but this progress needs to be extended to cover all sciences. We will advance that project here by comparing protein synthesis and natural selection. Both are called mechanisms, but the fields differ significantly, and Skipper and Millstein have recently argued that natural selection is not captured by the accounts of mechanisms currently available. They make the challenge:
We think the basic resources
Functional individuation
Mechanistic explanation begins with the identification of the phenomenon to be explained, and the mechanisms discovered are partially individuated by the phenomenon they are responsible for. Note that mechanisms are also individuated in other ways. Two different mechanisms that produce the same phenomenon will still be differentiated on the grounds of different parts, and their organization, as we will discuss. Nevertheless, the identification of the phenomenon to be explained is a crucial
Decomposition and mechanistic hierarchy
Once the phenomenon is identified, mechanistic explanation characteristically proceeds by decomposing the phenomenon into lower-level components. The activities of lower-level components are often regarded as further phenomena and further explanations are sought, so that decomposition moves to components another level down. This may iterate many times. So mechanisms discovered are usually located in just such a nested hierarchy, with relations to both lower-level and higher-level mechanisms in
Organization completes the explanation
Identifying the entities and their activities is not enough to explain the phenomenon. You have to understand how they produce the phenomenon of interest together—how they are organized. The importance of organization in the production of the phenomenon, and so in our full understanding of the phenomenon, is uncontroversial. MDC write: ‘The organization of these entities and activities determines the ways in which they produce the phenomenon’ (MDC, 2000, p. 3).
Conclusion
Mechanistic explanation begins with a specification of the phenomenon to be explained. At the least, this consists in an isolated description of a behaviour. Explanation then proceeds by identifying two kinds of parts—activities and entities—that contribute to producing that phenomenon. Entities and activities are both individuated in part by their roles in higher-level mechanisms, so that they have role-functions derived from the characterization of the phenomenon being explained. The
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust for funding this work on mechanisms. We are also grateful to numerous colleagues and students at Kent, Bristol, and internationally for discussion of ideas used here. Particular thanks are due to Tudor Baetu, Federica Russo, Erik Weber, and an anonymous referee.
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2016, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C :Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical SciencesOn closing the gap between philosophical concepts and their usage in scientific practice: A lesson from the debate about natural selection as mechanism
2016, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C :Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical SciencesCitation Excerpt :After all, both scientists and philosophers have already theorized and debated about the nature of natural selection for decades (Bouchard & Rosenberg, 2004; Horan, 1994; Matthen & Ariew, 2002; Millstein, 2006; Sober, 1984; Walsh, Lewens, & Ariew, 2002). It is perhaps unsurprising that some philosophers of biology are currently engaging in a debate about whether natural selection is a mechanism (Barros, 2008; Havstad, 2011; Illari & Williamson, 2010; Matthewson & Calcott, 2011; Nicholson, 2012; Skipper & Millstein, 2005). Instead of offering a resolution or answer to the debate about natural selection as a mechanism, this paper works to highlight what philosophers can learn from it.
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2015, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part ACitation Excerpt :For instance, Phyllis Illari & Jon Williamson follow Craver (2007) in reconstruing ontic explanation—or what they call physical explanation—as the thesis that mechanisms are self-explanatory, i.e., that they explain their own ϕ-ing (2011: 823). Or, as Illari & Williamson put it, ‘most new mechanistas [sic] agree with Craver’, including themselves: ‘[w]e agree with Craver that there is at least a sense of explanation that is ontic: that real-worldly mechanisms explain their phenomena by producing them’ (Illari, 2013: 238; Illari & Williamson, 2010: 280, italics adjusted; see also Darden, 2008: 959). On this reconstrual of OC, mechanisms explain by producing ϕ; or, if you like, mechanisms self-explain by ϕ-ing (or, equivalently and equally bizarre, there are no interesting differences between explaining and being mechanistically active).
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2014, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C :Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical SciencesCitation Excerpt :And Justin Garson more recently adds, “heart disease is something that happens when this mechanism is disrupted” (2013, p. 319).7 The key point here is that thinking that a mechanism can behave differently or not at all follows from something that is not “constitutive of its functioning as such” (Craver, 2013, p. 9) reflects a line of reasoning that is ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mechanisms (see also, Bechtel & Richardson, 1993, p. 19; Darden, 2006, p. 259; Illari & Williamson, 2010, p. 285). Consequently, the idea of failure or malfunction has been central for explaining what mechanisms do when they are not doing what they are supposed to do.
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