American Journal of Theology & Philosophy

I. Introduction

Within the past few years, the topic of human dignity has demonstrated distinct signs of a revitalization of interest both within and beyond academic discourse. Outside the academy, news headlines and Twitter feeds continue to generate discussions about whose lives matter, both in the United States (i.e., Black Lives Matter movement) and abroad (of prominent concern—the systematic human rights violations of ISIS). This has served to renject into civil discourse, with a renewed sense of urgency, the question: what does it mean for a human life to matter? What does it mean for a human life to have dignity? Within the academy,¹ scholars have recently approached this question by focusing on how to renegotiate and redefine a definition of human dignity in the wake of both a theological lineage (where dignity is a unique value, worth, or rank ascribed to human beings as result of their bestowed position in a divinely created order), and a Kantian lineage (where dignity is rooted in one’s rational and moral autonomy, which automatically entails the duty to treat human beings as ends rather than as means).

Though scholars such as Michael Rosen,² George Kateb,³ and Jeremy Waldron⁴ have advocated a move beyond theological appeals to intrinsic [End Page 263] worth,⁵ their suggestions about what to do with Kant’s legacy are more varied. Rosen adopts Kant’s fundamental thesis that dignity is grounded in one’s freedom to will one’s moral duty, but he ditches the Platonic elements of Kant in which dignity is granted transcendental status.⁶ Kateb expands upon rather than circumvents Kant by grounding dignity, not in moral agency, but in a “broader concept” of “free agency” that incorporates both moral and existential values.⁷ Finally, Waldron resists Kant altogether by viewing dignity as a fluid, historical convention that is either “leveled up” (expanding the rank of dignity from a narrow class of human beings to a universal one) or “leveled down” in its legal implementation. According to Waldron, dignity is best understood, not through introspective philosophical speculation, but rather through an analysis of our preexisting legal documents and declarations concerning rank, status, equality of citizens, etc.⁸ This puts him in close territory with Samuel Moyn⁹ and Hans Joas,¹⁰ who have both sought [End Page 264] in their work to highlight the historical contingency and strikingly recent origins of the concept of dignity as a universalizable human trait.

This brings us to the primary purpose of this paper, which is to inquire as to whether a theory of human dignity can be conceived that could escape the pressure to succumb to what seems like a forced choice presented in this literature: the choice of theology OR Kant OR social/historical convention. Is it possible to construct a theory of human dignity that can successfully negotiate between a theological account of dignity rooted in metaphysical ideas about a created order; a Kantian view of dignity rooted in notions of moral obligation; and an account of dignity as a fluid, historical convention that is either “leveled up” or “leveled down” in its social development. The central argument of this paper is that the skeleton of such a theory exists within Robert C. Neville’s systematic philosophical theology, which has now been published as a three-volume work.¹¹

II. Human Dignity in Robert C. Neville’s