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Propositional knowledge and know-how

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Abstract

This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist in propositional knowledge. The second part defends an analysis of know-how inspired by Katherine Hawley’ (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, pp. 19–31, insightful proposal that know-how requires counterfactual success. I conclude by showing how this analysis helps to explain why know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist of propositional knowledge.

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  1. School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singapore, 178903, Singapore

    John N Williams

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  1. John N Williams
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Correspondence to John N Williams.

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Williams, J.N. Propositional knowledge and know-how. Synthese 165, 107–125 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9242-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9242-1

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