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Why a Diachronic View of Base Property Exemplification is Necessary in Metaethics

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Metaphysica

Abstract

In a recent issue of this journal, Jorn Sonderholm presents two main criticisms of my 2008 case for a diachronic view of base property exemplification in metaethics. This essay contends that neither of Sonderholm’s criticisms hit their mark, and that there are additional reasons to adopt a diachronic view of base property exemplification. Thus, the case for a diachronic view of base property exemplification in metaethics is stronger than previously thought.

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Notes

  1. Strictly speaking, a diachronic view of base property exemplification could, in principle, apply to other domains, such as the mental and esthetic domains, but the current discussion will focus fairly exclusively on base property exemplification in moral philosophy.

  2. One might also wonder why Sonderholm faults me for not giving global supervenience its due in metaethics when he himself is aware of two problems with using global supervenience for this purpose; namely, global supervenience does not imply weak supervenience, and it allows for radical moral differences to supervene on quite minor descriptive differences. (Sonderholm 2011: 49, footnote 5).

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  1. English and World Languages Department, Joliet Junior College, 1215 Houbolt Road, Joliet, IL, 60431, USA

    Jeff Wisdom

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  1. Jeff Wisdom
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Correspondence to Jeff Wisdom.

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Wisdom, J. Why a Diachronic View of Base Property Exemplification is Necessary in Metaethics. Int Ontology Metaphysics 13, 43–50 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-012-0091-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-012-0091-0

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