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A problem with perspectival physicalism: A reply to tye

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Rowan University, 08028, Glassboro, New Jersey, USA

    Abe Witonsky

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  1. Abe Witonsky
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Witonsky, A. A problem with perspectival physicalism: A reply to tye. Philosophia 32, 285–293 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02641625

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02641625

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