Abstract
Biological taxonomists rely on the so-called ‘type method’ to regulate taxonomic nomenclature. For each newfound taxon, they lay down a ‘type specimen’ that carries with it the name of the taxon it belongs to. Even if a taxon’s circumscription is unknown and/or subject to change, it remains a necessary truth that the taxon’s type specimen falls within its boundaries. Philosophers have noted some time ago that this naming practice is in line with the causal theory of reference and its central notion of rigid designation: a type specimen fixes the reference of a taxon name without defining it. Recently, however, this consensus has come under pressure in the pages of this journal. In a series of articles by Alex Levine, Joseph LaPorte, and Matthew Haber, it has been argued that type specimens belong only contingently to their species, and that this may bode problems for the relation between type method and causal theory. I will argue that this ‘contingency debate’ is a debate gone wrong, and that none of the arguments in defense of contingency withstand scrutiny. Taxonomic naming is not out of step with the causal theory, but conforms to it. However, I will also argue that this observation is itself in need of further explanation, since application of the type method in taxonomic practice is plagued by errors and ambiguities that threaten it with breaking down. Thus, the real question becomes why taxonomic naming conforms to the causal theory in the first place. I will show that the answer lies in the embedding of the type method into elaborate codes of nomenclature.
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Notes
The modern-day type method should therefore not be confused with the Method of Type articulated by Whewell (1840). On the latter method, a type-element was defined as an exemplar that served to explore a taxon’s boundaries. The fascinating change in the meaning of ‘type’ from Method of Type to type method is traced in (Witteveen in progress).
A silenced name can be reactivated in the future. A change in judgment about taxon boundaries could leave the type specimens for ‘tetrataenia’ and ‘infernalis’ in separate taxa again, allowing the type specimen for ‘tetrataenia’ to return to senior status.
I will zoom in on de dicto necessity when discussing Haber’s argument.
There are in fact many more possible worlds for which this holds than LaPorte appears to realize. It not only holds for those worlds in which x was never born, but also for worlds in which another specimen y of S was discovered first.
Interestingly, LaPorte briefly notes at the outset of his article that ”Levine (2001, p. 335) thinks that [it] follows from species’ being individuals ... [that] individuals can lose parts, and [that] those parts can become parts of other individuals.” This shows that LaPorte is aware that Levine was worried about temporal contingency. LaPorte also observes that this worry may not be warranted: “It is not clear to me that just any individual’s parts could become parts of another individual.” However, LaPorte surprisingly fails to follow this thought through to its conclusion, thereby showing that Levine’s paradox does not arise. Instead, he abandons the discussion of temporal contingency and starts developing his argument about modal contingency, which he claims is “enough to generate the paradox” (LaPorte 2003, p. 584; italics mine). This is a critical error. The (apparent) paradox that LaPorte goes on to discuss is not Levine’s paradox.
Levine makes other errors that I will not discuss here. Let me just note that he may have also misunderstood the real force of the designation thesis. This much is suggested by his claim that “the species membership of a type specimen [can be] reassigned” in a revision of taxonomic boundaries (Levine 2001, p. 334). Haber similarly observes that that this claim “carries unwarranted modal force, and is incorrect.” (Haber 2012, p. 773).
It appears, though, that Haber is actually aiming to show the falsity of the more general de dicto sentence “Necessarily, any taxon with a type specimen contains its type specimen.” This is suggested by the fact that he roots his argument in case study of subspecies, from which he then infers conclusions about species without further explanation.
And two minor, terminological ones: First, it is a bit odd to state that type specimens designate taxa. Type specimens merely bear taxon names that designate taxa. Secondly, Case 3012 (on which Haber bases his analysis of Art. 75.6) concerns type specimens of subspecies, not species (see footnote 8).
This holds even if the name is suppressed in practice, when it is a junior synonym (see page 5).
Among the other type-based codes are the International Code of Nomenclature (ICN) for Algae, Fungi, and Plants (McNeill et al. 2012), the International Code of Nomenclature of Bacteria (ICNB) (Lapage et al. 1992), and the draft BioCode (Greuter et al. 2011), an ongoing attempt to unify domain-specific codes.
Note that this is only an error from the viewpoint of taxonomic naming. Biologists do name ‘organisms’ that belong to more than one taxon, like lichen—associations of a fungus with a photosynthetic partner. But these symbionts have no taxonomic status; they are only understood as ‘growth forms’. (In practice, taxonomists refer to lichen by the fungal component. See ICN Art. 13d and Jørgensen (1998).)
I thank Kim Sterelny for pointing this out.
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Acknowledgments
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at ISHPSSB 2013 in Montpellier, PBUK 2014 in Cambridge, and Utrecht University. I am grateful to these audiences for helpful feedback. Two anonymous reviewers, Matt Haber, Michael Devitt, and (especially) Kim Sterelny provided many thoughtful comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.
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Witteveen, J. Naming and contingency: the type method of biological taxonomy. Biol Philos 30, 569–586 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9459-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9459-6