Abstract
In this chapter I distinguish among different theories of gender essentialism and sketch out a taxonomy of gender essentialisms. I focus primarily on the difference between essentialism about a kind and essentialism about an individual. I propose that there is an interesting and useful form of gender essentialism that pertains to social individuals. And I argue that this form of gender essentialism, which I call uniessentialism, is not vulnerable to standard, feminist criticisms of gender essentialism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
I differentiate here among collections—e.g., the objects in my garage—that are arbitrary groupings of things; kinds—e.g., red things—that are groupings based on a property that defines its members; and natural kinds—e.g. biological species—that are kinds based on a non-arbitrary, explanatory or causal property. These are not uncontroversial distinctions but as I am not developing a theory of kind essentialism, they are not central to my purpose, and I won’t say more about them.
- 2.
Nominal essences, which I discuss at the end of this chapter, do not have causal or explanatory power.
- 3.
John Dupre is critical of the view that biological species are natural kinds in The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science.
- 4.
For a discussion of the main arguments against gender essentialism see my “Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Theory.”
- 5.
The second feature of essential properties, their causal or explanatory role, is not central to feminist criticisms of gender essentialism. Since anti-essentialist feminists tend to argue against the claim that there is any property common to all women, this condition will receive most of my attention in what follows.
- 6.
For a discussion of the difference between a modal conception of essentialism, in which the notion of a necessary property is basic, and a conception of essence that answers the question “what is it?” see Fine.
- 7.
Although individual essentialism is less prominent in feminist discussions than kind essentialism, there is reason to think that many feminists would reject it as well (Alcoff; Butler). One objection might be that it runs counter to the correct view of the self as a subject that chooses, negotiates, rejects, or performs identities like gender. On this view, nothing makes the individual man or woman the individual that he or she is, because the identities and self-understandings that make up our social selves are chosen, negotiated, performed, rejected and so on. Those who would advocate gender essentialism according to the second notion, therefore, are mistaking subjects or selves for objects or things—with serious consequences for the possibility of women’s agency (including their political activity), women’s autonomy, and women’s freedom (Alcoff; Butler). I call this the ontological argument against individual essentialism about gender because mistaking self-determining subjects or agents for causally determined objects is an ontological error. I argue in The Metaphysics of Gender that this objection fails.
- 8.
For a more detailed consideration of these arguments against gender essentialism, see my “Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Theory.”
- 9.
For an argument along similar lines see Mari Mikkola’s “Elizabeth Spelman, Gender Realism and Women.”
- 10.
I distinguish the two essentialisms in order to define my project not out of a belief that kind essentialism about gender is mistaken.
- 11.
For a good discussion of the ontological status of species, see Marc Ereshefsky’s article “Species” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- 12.
It is also possible to show that identity essentialism is different from kind essentialism, but I will not pursue that issue here.
- 13.
For simplicity I refer in what follows to women and men, but I think that the framework I develop could accommodate a third gender if that gender plays an analogous role in the social agency of some individuals as being a man or being a woman does to others. Transgendered individuals, for example, could have their social role occupancies organized by their being transgendered; being transgendered could be the principle of normative unity that unites their social roles and positions.
- 14.
In The Disorder of Things John Dupre argues that biological species are not natural kinds. And Eliot Sober in “Evolution, Population Thinking and Essentialism” argues that population thinking has replaced the notion of species in contemporary biology.
- 15.
In “Naming and Necessity” Kripke also discusses the essential features of kinds (like tiger) and stuffs (like water).
- 16.
A separate issue is whether or not Aristotle’s uniessentialism supports modal claims. It seems to me that it does support contrary-to-fact statements of potentiality or possibility like “If the wooden parts did not have the function of a house, then they would not constitute a house”. But the central focus of Aristotle’s theory of essence is their explanatory role in the organization and unity of substances and not the relationship between essences and modality. For a contemporary discussion of the difference between Aristotelian essentialism and contemporary modal essentialism see Fine.
- 17.
Appiah acknowledges that this is an oversimplification of the biological facts. Human sexual identity is determined using several criteria, which do not always line up with one another. For a discussion, see Fausto-Sterling.
- 18.
In addition to Fuss and deLauretis, mentioned earlier, both Alcoff and Battersby find the nominalist theory of gender essences to be preferable to an Aristotelian approach.
- 19.
See Stoljar’s contribution to this volume: “Different Women. Gender and the Realism-Nominalism Debate.”
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Witt, C. (2011). What Is Gender Essentialism?. In: Witt, C. (eds) Feminist Metaphysics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3783-1_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3783-1_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-3782-4
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-3783-1
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)