Abstract
In this essay I use the notion of divine values, those values analytically assigned to the concept of God, as a means of understanding replies to criticisms of open theism. I begin by orienting open theism according to the divine values open theist’s embrace within the larger context of relational theology. I then present three criticisms, a theological criticism, a practical criticism and a philosophical criticism and an open theist reply to each. Finally, I attempt to show the underlying motivation which unifies the open theist’s responses and points out where progress can be made in such discussions. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.
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Notes
It is also sometimes referred to in the literature as freewill theology.
Again, I don’t make this claim strictly for open theism. This is true of theological models other than open theism as well.
Open theists differ on the scope of God’s knowledge, but they agree that while God may know the end to which he will bring creation, God does not know the future free actions of particular individuals.
I have intentionally not included references for these criticisms as my point is not to attack or belittle them but to lay out a framework for understanding an open theist’s response.
One criticism is that open theists fail to have a fully developed metaphysic. I think this might well be right, but I’m not too impressed with it as a criticism given that I don’t know that I can say I am aware of any system which has a fully developed metaphysic. Thomism seems to be the closest to having a complete metaphysic. Perhaps the intent of this is to say that it is not adequately developed, but I am unaware of how this is to be shown to be the case. Having a ‘fully developed’ metaphysic may have its costs as well. Two that have been suggested to me are that with a more fully developed metaphysic there will be more danger that the metaphysical system will exert too much control in the interchange between one’s philosophy and theology. An additional concern is that by having a ‘more fully developed’ metaphysic a theological system will lack a certain valuable flexibility. These were suggested by William Hasker and John Sanders, respectively.
Open theists accept the libertarian analysis of free will. One formulation is that S (some subject) was free with respect to A (some action), if and only if, S was able to have done other than A. Open theists are incompatibilists, rejecting the view that a single action could be both determined and free.
In the literature on this topic this model of time is also called the static theory, the B-theory, the tenseless theory or the block theory.
As before, I do so with no intention of any deep commitment to its structure other than a perceived immediate usefulness.
It is important to note here that Thomas and others treat immutability as what some have termed ‘strong immutability’. A thing is strongly immutable if it cannot change in any of its intrinsic properties. This can be contrasted with weak immutability where some subset of a thing’s properties is changeless but other intrinsic properties might change. Those espousing weak immutability of God often say things like, God cannot change in his character, goodness or nature, but that God does change in other ways. For example, he changes when he responds in love and compassion to a prayer that we offer, or in response to a request we make. Open theists can accept weak immutability, but of course, so can any number of theological views. I will use the term ‘immutability’ as synonymous with ‘strong immutability’.
This is not merely true of open theism rather it is true of relational theologies in general.
This need not be thought to lead to a far reaching relativism. As a friend and mentor (Charles Moore) used to say interpretation is plastic, but not infinitely plastic.
It is worth noting that those of differing theological traditions offer interpretations as well. This is most obvious when they are addressing ‘difficult’ passages where on the face of it the passage looks to contradict their chosen view. While this is when it is most obvious I would hasten to add that even when we (open theist or others from differing theological traditions) take a passage at ‘face value’ we are giving an interpretation. Rendering a meaning which is devoid of interpretation is not possible. The move from scripture to doctrine makes this most clear. Doctrine is underdetermined by the text. This is true in part because, as Pinnock has affirmed, the Bible is pretheoretical. I prefer to say that the Bible is not a metaphysic text. Hence we cannot assume that there is a metaphysic presupposed by the text and demand an interpretation based on that.
Being a philosopher I no doubt will over emphasize this portion.
Usually the explanation is given that because our ways are not God’s ways contradictions can be meaningfully asserted of the divine. If this view is pushed everything can be said to be true of God, but that is hardly a useful theological position to take.
It seems worth pointing out that the discussion between open theists and others is not unique in this regard. Without accepting the law of non-contradiction we can not really get anywhere in a dialog.
This is not a commitment to a form of causal determinism that would entail fatalism. Even in the case where someone claims the existence of a unique future but asserts that the future will be what it is because of what I will choose to do (I don’t actually know if this statement makes sense but it has been used in my presence so I will appeal to it here) there is a problem. I call this view simple determinism where the future is determined, but I am the cause of what happens. The problem the open theist asserts is that if there is a unique future (determinism) then I am not able to do otherwise. There is a fact of the matter and hence there are not alternatives which I might actualize. See Hasker, W. (2002). The absence of a timeless God. In: G. E. Ganssle & D. M. Woodruff (Eds.), God and time: Essays on the divine nature (pp. 197–198). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The dynamic view of time is that the manifold of time is not complete. The most common form of this is presentism. The presentist claims that only the present exists; the past is no more and the future has not yet come to be.
Recall that a divine value is a value which is analytically a part of the divine nature.
Much of my thinking on this has been shaped by Peter van Inwagen and to some lesser extent by the writings of David Lewis. See van Inwagen, P. (1996). It is wrong, everywhere, always and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. In: J. Jordan & D. Howard-Snyder (Eds.), Faith, freedom and rationality (pp. 137–153). New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield. Reprinted in, Stump, E., & Murry, M. (Eds.) (1999). The big questions: Philosophy of religion. (pp. 273–284). Oxford: Blackwell. David Lewis has voiced somewhat similar things, see his introduction in, Lewis, D. (1983). Philosophical paper (Vol. 1, p. x). New York: Oxford University Press.
Although I disagree with his position, I think Thomas Flint has done a good job setting this up in his discussion of middle knowledge and the incarnation. This paper was read at the SCP, in the spring of 2003.
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Woodruff, D.M. Being and Doing in the Concept of God. Philosophia 35, 313–320 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9079-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9079-3