Abstract
Discussion of the “problem of numbers” in morality has focused almost exclusively on the moral significance of numbers in whom-to-rescue cases: when you can save either of two groups of people, but not both, does the number of people in each group matter morally? I suggest that insufficient attention has been paid to the moral significance of numbers in other types of case. According to common-sense morality, numbers make a difference in cases, like the famous Trolley Case, where we must choose whether to kill a person (or persons) as a side effect of saving a greater number. I argue that recognition of the role of numbers in killing cases forces us to reassess purported solutions to the problem of numbers.
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Notes
Some, for example, Wasserman and Strudler (2003), understand the term “nonconsequentialism” in such a way that an approach to the number problem only counts as nonconsequentialist if it “does not rely, directly or indirectly on the claim that more people saved is a better consequence.” On my understanding, a theory is Nonconsequentialist if it gives basic moral significance to something other than consequences.
The original trolley case was put forward by Foot (1967). In Foot’s version, it is a driver who can turn the trolley. Thomson’s version, in which the bystander must decide whether to turn, is now the canonical Trolley Case. Interestingly, in a footnote of a later article on the Trolley Problem, Thomson identifies Taurek as a possible dissenter from the general consensus that we are permitted to turn the trolley, saying that it is “possible (though by no means certain)” that he would argue that we should toss a coin (Thomson 1985, footnote 2).
Veronique Munoz-Dardé criticises the use of examples involving very large numbers of people to try to show that numbers count. She argues that if numbers matter, we should not need to inflate the numbers to make the case obvious. (2005, p. 209). Indeed, she suggests that when our intuitions are moved when numbers are inflated, this is because some other relevant feature is now in play (p. 210). I agree with Munoz-Dardé that we must take care when constructing large number cases. We must ensure that other features, such as the potential loss of a civilisation, do not muddy the waters (See my footnote 16). Nonetheless, I suggest that very large number cases can be useful in showing that numbers matter. I think the best explanation for the fact that it seems more obvious that we should save the greatest number when there is a huge difference in numbers is that numbers matter, but that other features also matter. We might think that there is some pull towards giving each person a chance to be saved in Rescue Cases and towards not doing harm in order to prevent harm in Killing Cases. These features may only be clearly outweighed when the numbers are large. (See Lawlor 2006; Sanders 1988.) I thank Munoz-Dardé for pressing me on this.
Although these arguments share a similar approach, there are some differences between them. I focus on the Balancing Argument as presented in Kamm (2005), but my criticisms apply equally to other Balancing/Tiebreaking Arguments.
It might be objected that I have unjustifiably assumed that the claims in question remain constant across different situations. It could be thought that A’s claim not be killed for no reason is not the same as A’s claim not to be killed to save B, which again differs from A’s claim not to be killed to save B, C, D, E and F. It seems to me to be correct that the claims differ. However, the challenge is for the Strong Non-Consequentialist to explain this while adhering to the individualistic restriction. I thank Matthew Smith for pressing me on this.
The case discussed by Kamm was originally produced by Derek Parfit as a counterexample to Scanlon’s approach (Parfit 2003, p. 368).
I thank Hallie Liberto for suggesting that the Strong Nonconsequentialist may wish to take this approach.
I thank Munoz-Dardé for pressing me on this.
Kamm (2005, p. 12–14) argues that in three party tie-breaker cases we face not only the question of whether A is in a tie with B, but also whether the tie-breaker would have a complaint, based on the seriousness of his own need, if he did not break the tie. I suggest that similar concerns apply to those whose needs are used to form virtual ties in multi-party Virtual Divisibility Cases.
This conclusion would obviously be rejected by proponents of the Balancing Argument who hold that each person has a claim for their needs to be considered in the context-sensitive pair-wise comparison described above. Munoz-Dardé spends some time responding to the Balancing Argument. (Munoz-Dardé, “The Distribution of Numbers and the Comprehensiveness of Reasons”, pp. 197–200.) However, as my interest is in whether Munoz-Dardé’s argument can be used to give an adequate Strong Nonconsequentialist account of the moral significance of numbers, I shall ignore that discussion here.
Quoted in Munoz-Dardé 2005, p. 196.
Munoz-Dardé gives a different account of the role of numbers in decisions regarding social policy. Here she suggests that the key issue is the extent to which individuals can make reasonable claims on others given the scarcity of resources. Numbers make a difference when they affect whether helping a given individual would require an unfair share of a joint resource (Munoz-Dardé 2005, pp. 208–213).
See, for example, the approach discussed but not endorsed by Scanlon (1998 p. 231).
I thank Antti Kaupinen for this suggestion.
The Strong Nonconsequentialist could hold that it impermissible to kill one to save any number of individual persons but nonetheless hold that there are some circumstances in which killing is permissible. For example, he might argue that we may kill to prevent the destruction of all sentient life, claiming that this loss is different in kind than the loss of a large, though finite, number of individuals. This would still require an appeal to non-individual losses, but not use straightforward aggregation. I ignore this complication here.
The Balancing/Tiebreaker Approach is able to explain some of the ways numbers matter in killing cases. For example, it can explain the thought that killing one to save one and killing five to save one are not morally equivalent. Suppose that we judge that killing B to save A is morally equivalent to killing B, C, D, E and F to save A. It seems that C (and D, E, and F) can each complain that the wrong she has suffered has not been appropriately taken into account. It makes sense to extend the original Balancing Argument to cover judgements about how bad a given action is: an individual can complain if we do judge an action that kills her in just the same way as we would have if she had not been killed. Such judgements do not require equal and opposing claims to be balanced off. It can also explain our intuitions about the Crossroads case: in this case all the claims in question are claims not to be killed so balancing is possible. I thank Hallie Liberto for pointing this out to me.
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to T.M. Scanlon, Veronique Munoz-Dardé and the audience at the British Society of Ethical Theory Annual Conference 2013 for helpful comments and advice.
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Woollard, F. The New Problem of Numbers in Morality. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 17, 631–641 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9496-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9496-x