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The robustness of altruism as an evolutionary strategy

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Abstract

Kin selection, reciprocity and group selection are widely regarded as evolutionary mechanisms capable of sustaining altruism among humans andother cooperative species. Our research indicates, however, that these mechanisms are only particular examples of a broader set of evolutionary possibilities.In this paper we present the results of a series of simple replicator simulations, run on variations of the 2–player prisoner's dilemma, designed to illustrate the wide range of scenarios under which altruism proves to be robust under evolutionary pressures. The set of mechanisms we explore is divided into four categories:correlation, group selection, imitation, and punishment. We argue that correlation is the core phenomenon at work in all four categories.

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Woodcock, S., Heath, J. The robustness of altruism as an evolutionary strategy. Biology & Philosophy 17, 567–590 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020598804674

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