Abstract
Yablo suggests that we can understand the possibility of mental causation by supposing that mental properties determine physical properties, in the classic sense of determination according to which red determines scarlet. Determinates and their determinables do not compete for causal relevance, so if mental and physical properties are related as determinable and determinates, they should not compete for causal relevance either. I argue that this solution won't work. I first construct a more adequate account of determination than that provided by Yablo. I then consider two common accounts of the mental, token identity theories and dispositional theories, and argue that on neither do mental and physical properties satisfy the requirements for determination.
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Worley, S. Determination and Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 46, 281–304 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005301816477
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005301816477