Abstract
Van Fraassen believes our current best theories enable us to make accurate predictions because they have been subjected to a selection process similar to natural selection. His explanation for the predictive success of our best theories has been subjected to extensive criticism from realists. I aim to clarify the nature of van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science. Contrary to what the critics claim, the selectionist can explain why it is that we have successful theories, as well as why it is reasonable to expect past successful theories to be successful in the future. I also argue that the plausibility of the realists’ explanation rests on an inaccurate understanding of the nature of predictive success. The predictive success of our best theories is a relative success.
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Notes
Merton (1973) developed an account similar to Hull’s, emphasizing the important role played by the social structure of science in enabling scientists to realize their epistemic goals.
Dear (2001) suggests that in the middle ages, “generally, the desideratum was to locate planets within the correct zodiacal sign, i.e. to within fifteen degrees” (p. 171, note 2).
This concern was raised by one of the referees.
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Acknowledgments
I thank the following people for feedback on earlier drafts: Lori Nash, Kristina Rolin, Kyle Stanford, Todd Grantham, Brad Monton, and Sarah Scott. As well, I thank my audiences at the Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association and the Canadian Society for the History and Philosophy of Science meeting where I presented earlier drafts. Finally, I thank the referees for Erkenntnis for their helpful feedback.
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Wray, K.B. Selection and Predictive Success. Erkenn 72, 365–377 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9206-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9206-6