Abstract
I examine the value and limitations of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the interests of developing a social epistemology of science, I argue that we should draw on Kuhn’s later work, published in The Road since Structure. There, Kuhn draws attention to the important role that specialty formation plays in resolving crises in science, a topic he did not discuss in Structure. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of specialty research communities. Kuhn’s later work provides a research agenda for those who want to study scientific specialization. I briefly discuss some recent studies that promise to provide valuable insight into the social structure of science.
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Notes
The term “paradigm” was used by others before Kuhn, as David Cedarbaum (1983) recounts. On the ultimate fate of the concept of paradigm in Kuhn’s philosophy see Wray (2011, Chapter 3). Contemporary with Kuhn’s use of the term “incommensurability” was Paul Feyerabend’s use of the term (see Feyerabend 1962). They were colleagues at the time, and Kuhn got feedback on an early draft of Structure from Feyerabend. Normal science, though, was original with Kuhn.
Marx and Bornmann (2010) report on the increasing use of the term “paradigm” in the titles of scientific articles. 1,372 articles published in 2008 in journals indexed in Web of Science had paradigm in the title. Only 8 articles published in 1961 had the term in the title.
Alexander Bird (2000) regards this dimension of Kuhn’s work as his key constructive contribution to philosophy of science. Indeed, philosophy of science is now so thoroughly naturalized that it can be challenging to imagine what philosophy of science was like before this turn.
Kuhn, though, changed his view on the relevance of the history of science to the philosophy of science (see Kuhn 2000a; and Wray 2011, Chapter 5). He later encouraged philosophers to adopt a historical perspective on science, that is, an evolutionary perspective. This is the key insight philosophers can learn from historians. Thus, the focus was no longer on using the history of science as a source of data to constrain our theorizing about science. There has been some debate about what role history can play in philosophy of science. On the one hand, it seems obvious that one cannot generalize from a case or two (Pitt 2001). But, on the other hand, an examination of case studies has led us to ask different questions about science, which in turn has enhanced our understanding of science and scientific change (see Burian 2001).
Kuhn thought that sociology was relevant to his project, but he envisaged sociologists helping us understand the social structure of research communities (see Kuhn 1962, 176–181). He thus did not anticipate the rise of the Strong Programme, which would cause him such grief later as he tried to distinguish his own view from their view (see Kuhn 2000a; and Wray 2011, Chapter 9).
According to Kuhn’s mature view of paradigms, it seems that the social sciences could have them. According to his mature view, a paradigm is an exemplar, a concrete solution to a scientific problem that provides a template for solving other related problems (see Kuhn 1974, Chapter 12; Wray 2011, Chapter 3). Margaret Masterman’s (1970) famous paradigm paper played a crucial role in helping Kuhn clarify his own understanding of paradigms. Kuhn came to believe that even before a consensus emerges in a field, scientists may work with a variety of paradigms (see Kuhn 2000c, 167-68, and 2000d, 300). Recently, Shiping Tang (2011) identified 11 “foundational paradigms” in the social sciences. According to Tang (2011) different paradigms “shed light on different aspects of human society, but each … can only shed light on a limited area of human society” (211).
I have defended Kuhn against the charge of constructionism elsewhere (see Wray 2011, Chapter 9). I argue that some forms of constructionism are less threatening than Kuhn’s critics suggest, and that Kuhn’s constructionism is not as radical as the constructionism of the Strong Programme.
Kristina Rolin (2002) also discusses the role of trust in science. Rolin raises the concern that scientists’ judgments of their colleagues’ trustworthiness may not map onto their trustworthiness reliably. She is especially concerned that this may affect the way reports by female scientists are received.
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Acknowledgments
I thank Lori Nash and the guest editor for this special issue, Rogier De Langhe, for constructive feedback on this paper.
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Wray, K.B. The Future of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . Topoi 32, 75–79 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-012-9140-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-012-9140-0