Abstract
In distinguishing justification from discovery, the logical empiricists hoped to avoid confusing causal matters with normative ones. Exaggerating the virtue of this distinction, however, has disguised from us important features of the concept of a reason as it functions in human practice. Surfacing those features gives some insight into reasoning and argument.
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REFERENCES
Russell, B.: 1959, The Problems of Philosophy, Galaxy, New York.
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Wright, L.: 1999, 'Reasons and the Deductive Ideal', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, 197-206.
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Wright, L. Justification, Discovery, Reason & Argument. Argumentation 15, 97–104 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007800732356
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007800732356