Abstract
I argue that the simple foreknowledge view, according to which God knows at some time t 1 what an agent S will do at t 2 , is incompatible with human free will. I criticize two arguments in favor of the thesis that the simple foreknowledge view is consistent with human freedom, and conclude that, even if divine foreknowledge does not causally compel human action, foreknowledge is nevertheless relevantly similar to other cases in which human freedom is undermined. These cases include those in which certain human actions are logically, rather than causally, foreclosed.
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Notes
See Hunt (2001), pp. 75–76.
Hunt (2001), p. 90.
Ibid.
See, e.g., Pereboom (2000) for a development of this distinction.
Zagzebski (1991), p. 154–62.
On this independence criterion, see Zagzebski (1997), p. 295.
Zagzebski (1997), p. 295.
This argument is relevantly similar to that offered by Zagzebski (1991), pp. 154–61.
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Wyckoff, J. On the Incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. SOPHIA 49, 333–341 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-010-0168-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-010-0168-6