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Doing and refraining from refraining

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Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to prove that in everystit semantic structure that contains a busy choice sequence, neither does doing imply refraining from refraining from doing, nor does refraining from refraining from doing imply doing.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 15260, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

    Ming Xu

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  1. Ming Xu
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Xu, M. Doing and refraining from refraining. J Philos Logic 23, 621–632 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01052780

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01052780

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