Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Crime, Freedom and Civic Bonds: Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Criminal Law and Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

There is no question Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is an engaging and powerful book which will inform legal philosophy, particularly Kantian theories, for years to come. The text explores with care Kant’s legal and political philosophy, distinguishing it from his better known moral theory. Nor is Ripstein’s book simply a recounting of Kant’s legal and political theory. Ripstein develops Kant’s views in his own unique vision illustrating fresh ways of viewing the entire Kantian project. But the same strength and coherence which ties the book to Kant’s important values of independence blinds the work to our shared moral ties grounded in other political values. Ripstein’s thoughts on punishment are novel in that he embeds criminal law, both in its retributivist and consequentialist facets, into Kant’s overarching political philosophy to show how criminal law can be seen as one aspect of the supremacy of public law. But a criminal law solely focused on the preservation of freedom takes little notice of the ways criminal law need expand its view to account for how a polity can restore the victim of a crime back to civic equality, reincorporate offenders after they have been punished and cannot leave past offenders isolated and likely to reoffend, resulting in the rotating door prison system and communities of innocents who remain preyed upon by career criminals. Lastly, a political theory that does not prize our civic bonds will ignore the startling balkanization of our criminal punishment practices, where policing, arresting and imprisonment become tools of racial and social oppression. In illustrating the benefits in viewing criminal law as a coherent part of Kant’s political theory of freedom, Ripstein also highlights what is absent. It then becomes clear that though Kant presents one important facet of punishment, only a republican political theory can meet the most pressing moral demands of punishment by reminding us that criminal law must be used to preserve and strengthen civic society.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Onora O’Neill points out that this is as true in Kant’s moral theory as in his legal theory. The idea that Kantian “rules,” be they moral, ethical or legal are simplistic algorithms or automatistic has always been a bum rap. Onora O’Neill, Kant: Rationality and Practical Reason in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, eds. Alfred J Mele and Piers Rawling 104 (2004).

  2. Every law professor or philosopher has a particular horror story of the failure of a duty to rescue in law that haunts them. Among the most infamous is that of David Cash, who witnessed his friend, Jeremy Strohmeyer, lure 7 year old Sherrice Iverson into a bathroom, trap her in a stall and sexually attack her. He left the bathroom and did nothing to stop the crime. Strohmeyer subsequently killed the young girl. Despite the immense publicity surrounding the crime, David Cash remained immune from criminal prosecution.

  3. I am very grateful to Sarah Holtman, Jane Johnson and Joshua Kleinfeld for a very enriching conversation on this and related subjects.

References

  • Braithwaite, J., & Pettit, P. (1993). Not just deserts: A republican theory of criminal justice.

  • Byrd, B. S. (1989). Kant’s theory of punishment: Deterrence in threat, retribution in its execution. 8 Law and Philosophy, 151.

  • Cooper, J. (2005). Political animals and civic friendship. In Kraut, R., & Skultety, S. (Eds.). Aristotle’s politics: Critical essays (pp. 72–74).

  • Fletcher, G. (1996). Domination in wrongdoing. 76 Boston University Law, 347.

  • Fletcher, G. (1999). Disenfranchisement as punishment: Reflections on the racial uses of infamia. UCLA Law Review, 46, 1895.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fletcher, G. (2007). The grammar of criminal law: American, comparative, and international, Vol. 1: Foundations.

  • Hart H. L. A. (1968). Punishment and responsibility.

  • Holtman, S. (2011). Kant, retributivism, and civic respect. In White M. D. (Ed.). Retributivism: Essays on theory and policy.

  • Huigens, K. (1995). Virtue and inculpation. 108 Harvard Law Review, 1423, 1476–1478.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hurd, H. M., & Moore, M. S. (2004). Moore, punishing hatred and prejudice. 56 Stan. L. Rev, 1081.

  • Hyman, D. (2006). Rescue without law: An empirical perspective on the duty to rescue. 84 Tex. L. Rev, 653.

  • Johnson, J. (2011). Hegel on punishment: A more sophisticated retributivism. In White, M. D. (Ed.). Retributivism: Essays on theory and policy.

  • Kant, I. (1930). Lectures on ethics (trans: Infield L).

  • Kant, I. (1965). The metaphysical elements of justice 331, 363 (trans: J. Ladd) Rechtslehre.

  • Kraut, R. (2002). Aristotle.

  • Moreau S. R. (2010). What is discrimination? 38 Phil. and Pub. Affairs, 143.

  • Murphy, M. (1987). Does Kant have a theory of punishment? 87 Columbia Law Review, 509.

  • Nozick R. (1974). Anarchy, state and Utopia.

  • Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government.

  • Pettit, P. (2002). Keeping republican freedom simple: On a difference with quentin skinner, 30 political theory 339 .

  • Postema, G. J. (2010). Rights, equality, and justice: A conference inspired by the moral and legal theory of David Lyons: Law’s Ethos: Reflections on the public practice of illegality. 90 B.U.L. R ev, 1847.

  • Skinner, Q. (1978). The foundations of modern political thought (Vol. 1).

  • Skinner, Q. (1984). The idea of negative liberty: Philosophical and historical perspectives In Rorty, R., Schneewind, J. B., & Skinner, Q. (Eds.). Philosophy in history.

  • Solum, L. B. (2006). Natural justice, 51 Am. J. Juris, 65.

  • Tadros, V. (2011). Independence without interests?, 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 193.

  • Viroli, M. (1993). Machiavelli and the republican idea of politics In Bock, G., Skinner Q., & Viroli, M. (Eds.) Machiavelli and republicanism.

  • Waldron, J. (1996). Kant’s legal posivitism. 109 Harvard Law Review, 1535.

  • Yankah, E. N. (2004). Good guys and bad guys: punishing character, equality and the irrelevance of moral character to criminal punishment. 25 Cardozo L. Rev, 1019.

  • Yankah E. N. (2008). The force of law: The role of coercion in legal normativity. 42 U. Rich. L. Rev, 1195.

  • Yankah E. N. (2011). A paradox in overcriminalization. 14 New Criminal Law Review, 1.

  • Yankah, E. N. (2012). Liberal virtue. In Amaya, A., & Lai, H. H. (Eds). Law, virtue and justice, (forthcoming).

  • Yankah, E. N. (2012). Legal vices and civic virtue, Crim. Law and Phil. (forthcoming).

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ekow N. Yankah.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Yankah, E.N. Crime, Freedom and Civic Bonds: Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Criminal Law, Philosophy 6, 255–272 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-012-9145-1

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-012-9145-1

Keywords

Navigation