Abstract
In trying to establish the view that there are no non-living macrophysical objects, Trenton Merricks has produced an influential argument—the Overdetermination Argument—against the causal efficacy of composite objects. A serious problem for the Overdetermination Argument is the ambiguity in the notion of overdetermination that is being employed, which is due to the fact that Merricks does not provide any theory of causation to support his claims. Once we adopt a plausible theory of causation, viz. interventionism, problems with the Overdetermination will become evident. After laying out the Overdetermination Argument and examining one extant objection to it, I will explicate the relevant aspects of an interventionist theory of causation and provide a characterization of overdetermination that follows from such an account. From this, I will argue that the Causal Principle that undergirds the Overdetermination Argument is false and hence the argument is invalid; and I claim that the only other available characterization of overdetermination would render a key premise in the argument false. Thus, the Overdetermination Argument fails to provide us with any reason to deny the causal efficacy of macrophysical objects, and therefore provides no reason to doubt their existence.
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Notes
For instance, van Inwagen (1990), Merricks (2001). van Inwagen and Merricks have different reasons for endorsing Eliminativism—though both want to maintain the existence of you and me (and some other biological organisms). There is a related view, sometimes labeled ‘nihilism’, which argues that there are no macrophysical objects at all, whether living or non-living.
Although van Inwagen would endorse the existence of plants, trees and the like, Merricks is agnostic as to whether there are such objects since his argument for the non-causal-redundancy of composite objects extends only to conscious entities such as human beings and some other animals.
By ‘material simple’, I mean a material object which has no proper parts.
Of course, one could argue for Eliminativism by other means, e.g. van Inwagen’s claim that it is the only viable answer to the Special Composition Question in (1990), or that it is the only plausible answer to puzzles concerning material constitution (e.g., Ship of Theseus, Tibbles-Tib, Goliath/Lumpl, etc.).
Merricks’ use of ‘causal relevance’ and ‘causal irrelevance’ does not follow standard usage; instead he employs it as a term of art, which he provides a characterization (see below). This terminology is regrettable since such use can make the discussion a bit confusing. To alleviate some of the confusion, I will put double quotation marks around it when I intend to use it with Merricks’ meaning, and I will leave it bare when I use it in its more standard usage.
This argument would seem to result in the causal redundancy of even living material objects; however, Merricks later provides an argument claiming that conscious objects are not causally redundant, cf. Merricks (2001, Chaps. 4 and 5).
Now Merricks is open to the possibility of a gunky world such that matter is infinitely divisible; nevertheless, he suspects that there may still exist the fundamental particles posited by physicists even if there are no macroscopic composite objects (though this might be a dubious claim).
One possible problem for [2] is that there may be no scientific justification for it. Merricks cannot simply brush aside scientific claims since he himself appeals to the “scientific attitude” with respect to justifying [iv]:
This rejection of ‘downward’ causation is part of the ‘scientific attitude’ and ‘bottom-up’ metaphysics, according to which the final and complete causal stories will involve only the entities over which physics quantifies…but I think few would resist taking the ‘scientific attitude. (Merricks 2001, p. 60)
However, his reliance on such scientific attitudes may render [2] problematic since some have argued that there is no concept of causation at the level of fundamental physics (the level of Merricks’ atoms), cf. Loewer (2001), Hitchcock (2007), Elga (2007), and for an early source of this, Russell (1912). So if there is no such concept, then perhaps it is problematic to claim that the atoms cause the shattering of the window. However, I leave such worries aside (since my focus will be on [3]) and will accept [2].
I should note that I am not as hostile to such notions, and there seems to be promising work in the recent revival over what might be considered a version of the generative/productive account of causation, viz. powers theory.
Olson is referring to another principle here, but for our purposes, they are relevantly similar such that his complaint regarding the lack of a causal theory also applies. Olson then proposes a “chance-raising” account of causation and suggests that overdetermination is unproblematic from such an account (though I worry whether his account would also permit cases of objectionable overdetermination).
The Mob rules out independent overdetermination since the two competing objects, viz. the individuals that make up the mob and me, do not bear any of the relations that are involved in cases of incorporative overdetermination (such as the relation of supervenience, constitution, realization, etc.). So if I were also a cause of the vandalism, then the vandalism would be independently overdetermined by the individuals in the mob and me. For now, it suffices to merely have an intuitive grasp of the kind of independence that is holding between the two causes, but I will later argue that interventionism provides a better understanding of that independence (as a preview for the sequel, the causes in a case of independent overdetermination are such that these causes are independently manipulable and so can be represented in a single causal model).
Thomasson makes this point (2006, p. 342).
Paul takes the worry of constitutive/incorporative overdetermination seriously, and resolves the problem by claiming that the composite object and its matter share a part (viz., a property-instance) that is the literal cause, and so there is no causal competition between the object and its matter since neither as a whole are considered to be the actual causal relata.
Woodward leaves open as to what entities can serve as the value of these variables, e.g. objects, events, properties, etc.
Woodward uses ‘cause’ and ‘causally relevant’ interchangeably. This may be turn out to be problematic; however, I will loosely go back and forth as well since Woodward does, although I take the crucial notion here to be that of causal relevance.
This relativization of causation to some variable set V has been a source of criticism against interventionism—cf. Strevens (2007). Although Woodward seemed to back away from the claim of causal relativity to a variable set (2008b)—and for a reply, see Strevens (2008)—Weslake rightly notes that causal relativity need not be construed as a form of anti-realism, since causal claims are not made true by the representational models employed in an interventionist framework but are “made true by the counterfactuals regarding experimental interventions that are represented by those models” (Weslake, unpublished, 4–5 typescript). Perhaps Woodward would agree here since he states that the relativity is regarding the causal judgments and representations and that the relativity is not over causation that is out in the world (2008b, pp. 202–203). However, in Woodward’s later papers, he moves away from talk of variable sets and rather focuses on background conditions (2008a).
I borrow this terminology from Baumgartner (2010, p. 365).
For more on independent manipulability, see Weslake (unpublished), 15 typescript.
I thank Michael Rescorla for this point.
In fact, in Woodward’s later papers, he alters his definition of a cause, and moves away from language involving variable sets and focuses rather on background conditions (perhaps to distance himself from the charge of relativity to a variable set).
For Woodward’s account of overdetermination, see (2003, pp. 77–86 (esp. 84)). Weslake provides a nice explication of overdetermination in an interventionist framework in (unpublished), 7–9 typescript.
This is just one composition question, the Special Composition Question, popularly formulated by van Inwagen (1990).
Although any alteration in the value of B would result in the change in the value of A, it may be the case that an intervention on A would not result in a change of value for B if the baseball can be “multiply realized” by different atoms, which Sosa (1987) seems to suggest. But it is adequate for my argument that there can be no intervention on B while keeping the value of A fixed, for then B and A won’t be independently manipulable and hence any causal model with V* violates FIX.
Thomasson (2006, p. 347).
Thomasson (2007, p. 16). The basic idea is that if φ analytically entails ψ, then both φ and ψ have the same truth-makers and so do not require “anything more in the world…[ψ] does not require any extra causal action beyond what was averted to in φ”. So Thomasson concludes that there is no additional causal occurrence nor any causal competition. And since the atoms arranged baseball-wise is causally relevant to the shattering of the window, then the baseball is also causally relevant to the window shattering.
Though Thomasson provides an extended treatment of her understanding of analytical entailment in chapter 2 (2007).
It should be clearer now why The Mob is a case that rules out independent overdetermination since the individuals that make up the mob and me can both be represented in the same causal model (such that if I were a cause of the vandalism, then the vandalism would be independently overdetermined by me and the members of the mob). Given that the individuals of the mob and I are independently manipulable, both can be included in the same variable set without violating FIX.
As Thomasson would agree, for even if the baseball and that atoms (acting in concert) are overdetermined in Merricks’ sense (i.e., incorporatively), “they do not seem to provide a case of real overdetermination of a kind that was supposed to be worrying” (2006, p. 349).
Funkhouser (2002) also mentions a third type of overdetermination, viz. Iterative Overdetermination; however, that kind does not seem to be relevant in this case.
What I believe the Overdetermination Argument does show is that non-living physical composites are not substances, not that such objects don’t exist (cf. Toner 2008).
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Trenton Merricks, James Woodward, Nathan Salmon, Michael Rescorla, Alissa Yang, Joe Lee, and an anonymous referee for helpful conversations or comments on previous versions of this paper. Special thanks are due to Tony Brueckner for his comments on earlier drafts and our many discussions on this topic.
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Yang, E. Eliminativism, interventionism and the Overdetermination Argument. Philos Stud 164, 321–340 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9856-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9856-0