Conclusion
The foregoing set of theorems forms an effective foundation for the theory of situations and worlds. All twenty-five theorems seem to be basic, reasonable principles that structure the domains of properties, relations, states of affairs, situations, and worlds in true and philosophically interesting ways. They resolve 15 of the 19 choice points defined in Barwise (1989) (see Notes 22, 27, 31, 32, 35, 36, 39, 43, and 45). Moreover, important axioms and principles stipulated by situation theorists are derived (see Notes 33, 37, and 38). This is convincing evidence that the foregoing constitutes a theory of situations. Note that worlds are just a special kind of situation, and that the basic theorems of world theory, which were derived in previous work, can still be derived in this situation-theoretic setting. So there seems to be no fundamental incompatibility between situations and worlds — they may peacably coexist in the foundations of metaphysics. The theory may therefore reconcile two research programs that appeared to be heading off in different directions. And we must remind the reader that the general metaphysical principles underlying our theory were not designed with the application to situation theory in mind. This suggests that the general theory and the underlying distinction have explanatory power, for they seem to relate and systematize apparently unrelated phenomena.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Bibliography
Aczel, P., 1988,Non-Weil-Founded Sets, CSLI Lecture Notes, No. 14, Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information Publications.
Adams, R. M., 1974, “Theories of Actuality,”Nous 8: 211–31.
Adams, R. M., 1981, “Actualism and Thisness,”Synthese 49: 3–41.
Anderson, C. A., 1984, “General Intensional Logic,” inHandbook of Philosophical Logic, Vol. II, D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 355–85.
Barwise, J., 1985, “The Situation in Logic — III: Situations, Sets, and the Axiom of Foundation,” Technical Report No. CSLI-85-26, Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information Publications; page references are to the reprint in Barwise (1989).
Barwise, J., 1989,The Situation in Logic, CSLI Lecture Notes, No. 17, Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information Publications.
Barwise, J. and Perry, J., 1980, “The Situation Underground,” inStanford Working Papers in Semantics, J. Barwise and I. Sag (eds.), Stanford Cognitive Science Group.
Barwise, J. and Perry, J., 1981a, “Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations,” inMidwest Studies in Philosophy: 6, P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 387–404.
Barwise, J. and Perry, J., 1981b, “Situations and Attitudes,”Journal of Philosophy 78/11: 668–691.
Barwise, J. and Perry, J., 1983,Situations and Attitudes, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Barwise, J. and Perry, J., 1984, “Shifting Situations and Shaken Attitudes,” Technical Report No. CSLI-84-13, Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information Publications; also published inLinguistics and Philosophy 8/1 (1985): 105–61 (all page references are to the 1984 publication).
Castañeda, H. N., 1974, “Thinking and the Structure of the World,”Philosophia 4: 3–40.
Chisholm, R., 1976,Person and Object, La Salle: Open Court.
Cresswell, M., 1973,Logics and Languages, London: Methuen.
Church, A., 1951, “A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation,”Structure, Method, and Meaning, New York: The Liberal Arts Press.
Deutsch, H., 1990, “Contingency and Modal Logic,”Philosophical Studies 60: 89–102.
Fine, K., 1977, “Postscript” to Arthur Prior,Worlds, Times, and Selves, Amherst: University of Massachusetts.
Fine, K., 1985, “Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse,” inAlvin Plantinga, J. Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Frege, G., 1892, “On Sense and Reference,” inTranslations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, P. Geach and M. Black (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1970, 56–78.
Kaplan, D., 1977, “Demonstratives,” inThemes from Kaplan, J. Almog, H. Wettstein, and J. Perry (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, 481–563.
Kripke, S., 1963, “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic,”Acta Philosophica Fennica 16: 83–94.
Kripke, S., 1959, “A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic,”Journal of Symbolic Logic 24: 1–15.
Lewis, D., 1986,On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D., 1973, “Possible Worlds,” inCounterfactuals, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 84–91.
Lycan, W., 1988, “Review ofOn the Plurality of Worlds,”The Journal of Philosophy 85 (January): 42–47.
Mally, E., 1912,Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik, Leipzig: Barth.
Meinong, A., 1904, “Über Gegenstandstheorie,” in A. Meinong (ed.),Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, Leipzig: Barth; English translation, “On the Theory of Objects,” inRealism and the Background of Phenomenology, R. Chisholm (ed.), Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960, 76–117.
Menzel, C., 1991, ‘The True Modal Logic,”Journal of Philosophical Logic 20: 331–374.
Montague, R., 1974,Formal Philosophy, R. Thomason (ed.), New Haven: Yale University Press.
Myhill, J., 1963, “An Alternative to the Method of Extension and Intension,” inThe Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, P. Schilpp (ed.), La Salle: Open Court, 299–310.
Perry, J., 1986, “From Worlds to Situations,”Journal of Philosophical Logic 15: 83–107.
Plantinga, A., 1974,The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon.
Plantinga, A., 1976, “Actualism and Possible Worlds,”Theoria 42: 139–60.
Pollock, J., 1984,The Foundations of Philosophical Semantics, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Quine, W. V. O., 1960, “Variables Explained Away,” reprinted inSelected Logic Papers, New York: Random House, 227–35.
Rapaport, W., 1978, “Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Paradox,”Nous 12: 153–80.
Sosa, E., 1986, “Imagery and Imagination — Sensory Images and Fictional Characters,” inGrazer Philosophische Studien, R. Haller (ed.),25/26: 485–500.
Stalnaker, R., 1986a, “Possible Worlds and Situations,”Journal of Philosophical Logic 15: 109–23.
Stalnaker, R., 1986b, “Counterparts and Identity,” inMidwest Studies in Philosophy, XI, P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 121–140.
Stalnaker, R., 1985,Inquiry, Cambridge: Bradford/MIT.
Stalnaker, R., 1976, “Possible Worlds,”Nous 10: 65–75.
van Inwagen, P., 1986, “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds,” inMidwest Studies in Philosophy, XI, P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 185–213.
Zalta, E., 1991, “A Theory of Situations,” inSituation Theory and Its Applications, II, J. Barwise, G. Plotkin, and S. Tutiya (eds.), Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information Publications.
Zalta, E., 1988,Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality, Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
Zalta, E., 1987, “On the Structural Similarities between Worlds and Times,”Philosophical Studies 51: 213–39.
Zalta, E., 1983,Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
This research was conducted at the Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI). I would like to thank John Perry for generously supporting my research both at CSLI and in the Philosophy Department at Stanford. I would also like to thank Bernard Linsky, Chris Menzel, Harry Deutsch and Tony Anderson for many worthwhile and interesting suggestions for improving the paper. An earlier version of the paper, more narrowly focused on situation theory, has appeared in Zalta (1991).
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Zalta, E.N. Twenty-five basic theorems in situation and world theory. J Philos Logic 22, 385–428 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01052533
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01052533