Abstract
I argue that the constitution relation transmits causal efficacy and thus is a suitable relation to deploy in many troubled areas of philosophy, such as the mind–body problem. We need not demand identity.
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Notes
I think that it is not an implausible view of identity that it is a complex notion. Perhaps, A and B are identical when A is a part of B and B is a part of A, or perhaps A and B are identical when A is constitutive of B and B is constitutive of A. Why take identity to be fundamental? It is common to assert that it is. Perhaps it is, but I have never seen a good reason for taking it to be fundamental. Perhaps, other notions are fundamental and identity can be explained in terms of them.
References
Lynne Baker 2000: Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lynne Baker 2007: The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jerry Fodor 1987: Psychosemantics, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press.
Jaegwon Kim 1993: Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jaegwon Kim 2000: Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press.
Colin McGinn 2002: Logical Properties, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ted Sider 2002: “Review of Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies”, Journal of Philosophy 99: 45–48.
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Zangwill, N. Constitution and Causation. Int Ontology Metaphysics 13, 1–6 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0088-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0088-0