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In Defence of Functionalism

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Andrei Buckareff for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper, and to Professor Asa Kasher for helpful suggestions.

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Correspondence to Jing Zhu.

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Zhu, J. In Defence of Functionalism. Philosophia 34, 95–99 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-006-9003-2

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