Abstract
The first half of this paper is an attemptto conceptualize and understand the paradoxicalnotion of ``passive action''. The strategy is toconstrue passive action in the context ofemotional behavior, with the purpose toestablish it as a conceivable and conceptuallycoherent category. In the second half of thispaper, the implications of passive action forcausal theories of action are examined. I arguethat Alfred Mele's defense of causalism isunsuccessful and that causalism may lack theresource to account for passive action.Following Harry Frankfurt, I suggest analternative way of understanding the nature ofaction that can accommodate passive action.
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Zhu, J. Passive Action and Causalism. Philosophical Studies 119, 295–314 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000030433.41964.14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000030433.41964.14