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Responsibility, Reaction, and Value

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Abstract

Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility.

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Notes

  1. Strawson (1962).

  2. Cf. Watson (2004, p. 220).

  3. Cf. Fischer and Ravizza (1993, pp. 16–17).

  4. Cf. Wallace (1994, pp. 76–77) (but contrast Wallace 1994, pp. 87–88) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998, p. 7).

  5. Cf. Brentano (1969, p. 18): “[T]he good is that which is worthy of love, that which can be loved with a love that is correct”.

  6. Cf. Ewing (1948, p. 152): “We may…define ‘good’ as ‘fitting object of a pro attitude’”.

  7. Cf. Chisholm (1986, p. 52): “A is intrinsically preferable to B = df A and B are necessarily such that, for any x, the contemplation of just A and B by x requires that x prefer A to B”.

  8. Cf. Lemos (1994, pp. 12, 15): “p is intrinsically worthy of love if and only if p is necessarily such that, for any x, the contemplation of just p by x requires that x love p and not hate p… p is intrinsically good if and only if p obtains and p is intrinsically worthy of love”.

  9. Scanlon (1998, pp. 96–97).

  10. Cf. Brännmark (2008, pp. 307–308).

  11. Ross (1930, Chapter 3).

  12. See Zimmerman (2001, Chapter 2), for elaboration.

  13. Cf. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004, p. 393).

  14. Ross (1930, p. 21 f.).

  15. Ross (1930, p. 27).

  16. Among others: Parfit (2001), Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004), Olson (2004), Persson (2007) and Danielsson and Olson (2007).

  17. Cf. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004, pp. 422–423).

  18. Cf. Blanshard (1961, pp. 284–286). To say that x’s goodness grounds the fittingness of favoring it is not to say that the former is the ultimate ground of the latter. On the contrary, its goodness is itself presumably grounded in some non-evaluative property that it has.

  19. Cf. Ewing (1948, pp. 157, 172) and Scanlon (1998, p. 97).

  20. See Zimmerman (2007, pp. 346 f.) for further discussion.

  21. The locus classicus is Hohfeld (1919, p. 35 ff).

  22. Again (see note 18 above), to say that Q’s duty is grounded in P’s right is not to say that the former is the ultimate ground of the latter. Perhaps rights are themselves grounded in rules, which are themselves grounded in certain non-normative properties.

  23. Cf. Rachels (1978, p. 157) and Sadurski (1985, p. 117).

  24. Cf. Feldman (1997, pp. 182–184).

  25. Cf. Feinberg (1970, pp. 30–31), Schlossberger (1992, pp. 100–101, 163 f.), Haji (1998, pp. 3–4, 174–175) and Watson (2004, pp. 265, 316).

  26. I say “seems,” because the evidence is not conclusive. At Wallace (1994, p. 76) we read: “…holding a person responsible does not involve the belief that the reactive emotions are required by the person’s violation of moral obligations, …but only the weaker belief that it would be appropriate…for one to feel such emotions…” At Fischer and Ravizza (1998, p. 7) it is stated: “…on the Strawsonian view, being morally responsible is being an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes.”

  27. Cf. Zimmerman (1988, Chapter 5).

  28. Cf. Scanlon (1998, Sections 6.3 and 6.4).

  29. Cf. Zimmerman (1988, Chapter 3).

  30. Cf. Zimmerman (1988), passim; Scanlon (1998, Section 6.4). My position concerning the relation between freedom of will and appraisability is actually more nuanced than the report I have just given of it. Cf. Zimmerman (2002) for a qualification.

  31. Adams (1985, p. 19).

  32. Schlossberger (1992, pp. 117–118).

  33. See, e.g., Brandt (1959, pp. 470 f.), Milo (1984, pp. 41 f.) and Watson (2004, Chapter 9).

  34. Scanlon (1998, pp. 285–286).

  35. Quoted in van Inwagen (1983, pp. 63–64).

  36. As before (see note 30 above), this is actually an oversimplification of my view regarding the relation between desert of punishment and freedom of will. For refinement, see Zimmerman (2002, pp. 570–571), especially.

  37. Cf. Watson (2004, Chapter 9), on the two kinds of responsibility that he calls “attributability” and “accountability.”

  38. Watson (2004, p. 266).

  39. Zimmerman (1988, pp. 112–113).

  40. Fischer and Ravizza (1998, Chapters 2 and 3).

  41. Haji (1998, Chapter 7).

  42. McKenna (forthcoming).

  43. For helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper I am grateful to the editor, to some anonymous referees, and also to members of audiences at Florida State University, Delft University of Technology, and the University of Montreal.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, 27412, USA

    Michael J. Zimmerman

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Zimmerman, M.J. Responsibility, Reaction, and Value. J Ethics 14, 103–115 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-010-9073-z

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