From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Mind:

2009-06-14
The 'Explanatory Gap'
Reply to Stevan Harnad
SH: "Because what is needed is an explanation (e.g., gravity) of the datum [an apple falling] , not a "definition."

Gravity per se is a fundamental force that has not been explained, just as consciousness/feeling per se (its sheer existence) has not been explained and probably cannot be explained, as I have stated earlier in this thread.

Stevan, I agree with you that we need an explanation of the datum, but consciousness is not a datum. However, instances of consciousness are data, and these are what need to be explained and, I believe, can be explained. I prefer to call such instances of consciousness "phenomena". The retinoid theory provides a principled biophysical explanation of phenomena (what you call feelings), and elucidates the difference between phenomena and unconscious cognitive processes in the brain. In my theoretical analysis it turns out that all phenomena share the common feature of being a transparent representation of the world from a privileged egocentric perspective (TROWPEP). So I take this observation as the justification for my definition of consciousness (TROWPEP). Let's be clear. My definition of consciousness is not an explanation. The retinoid model is my explanation of consciousness and it motivates my definition.


... AT