Derek,

As I understand it, phenomenal consciousness applies to the overall structure of experience. This links up with Nagel's "what it's like" just in case there is something it's like to be in a particular conscious state. I don't think that this is meant to capture consciousness in a very broad sesnse (for example, some would happily argue that there is no "what it's like" tied to at least certain propositional attitudes). Instead, the experential aspects of consciousness are taken, by some philosophers, to be central as they seem to be how we navigate and get along out in the world. So it doesn't seem that one needs to provide a complete account of consciousness in order to explain what is absent in the case of zombies; it's the qualitative aspect of consciousness that's absent--whether that constitutes the whole of consciousness or not is certainly arguable, but that's the "ordinary" usage that Chalmers intends to be using in the argument.

Is the line that you want to take here to suggest that this "ordinary" usage doesn't come so easily nor get us so far? If that's not what you're suggesting, then I'm afraid I've gotten myself lost somewhere and would be grateful if you could explain exactly what your objection is.