Tim

You say: "The zombie argument is an argument against physicalist theories in general; it doesn't give an explanation of consciousness (though you will end up with some dualist notion of consciousness) because the only intention is to show that no theory that gives a purely physical account of consciousness can be correct."

I must say I don't really see how it can be an argument for or against anything. To the extent that it relies on the notion of a being identical to a human being but without consciousness, it is a non-starter in my view since the proponents seem to think no prior definition of consciousness is required (or that, at most, one can rely on something as inadequate as the Nagel 'definition'). But in that case the concept of "without consciousness" is surely quite vacuous. We are left with a formula x - y where we know x (or at least assume we do) but have no idea what y is.

I find myself wondering at times if the notion of a zombie is not partly due, subliminally at least, to the influence of Hollywood science fiction. The makers of such films who see philosophers taking their productions seriously must surely be mightily amused (all the way to the bank...)

DA.