2009-10-21
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A theory of religion
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Jim StoneUniversity of New Orleans
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Thanks for the kind words, Timothy and Caroline’ Caroline writes:
3) Isn’t “surpasses what sense perception reveals” too arbitrary to be a good criterion for something being supernatural (if that’s what you intend)? Wouldn't it mean that supernaturalness is relative to history of science or that we do not know whether something is really supernatural?
[I write: ‘I take it to be intuitive that religions are concerned with a reality that surpasses the ordinary world that sense perception reveals. This reality consists either of (a) sentient supernatural beings (e.g. gods) or of (b) an insentient metaphysical principle underlying the universe (e.g. The Unconditioned, Sunyata, or The Tao). This principle has features that mark it as belonging to a different order of reality from the objects that make up the mundane world: it cannot be named or cognized, it can be described only in contradictions, it doesn't arise or pass away, it issues in everything else, it is utterly changeless, or...’
So I don’t rely entirely on what I say about sense perception; a and b play a role too. Possibly there are difficulties here, however I suppose what matters is what satisfies the criteria according to the religion itself. That is, its own idea of the super mundane is what counts. I don’t suppose it matters whether we know something is really supernatural.]
4) How would you classify Aristotle’s metaphysics (including unmoved mover and all) on your definition? (In my mind this hooks up to my first suggestion.)
[I probably don’t know enough about this, however my inclination is to say that there is nothing there that constitutes an SR such that practices place us in relation of value to it. Maybe you can give a reason to think otherwise.]
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