From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Language:

2009-11-19
Games and Family Resemblances
Reply to Jim Stone
Professor Stone,

You say, "a response which says 'Well, Ludwig didn't mean to deny that games share a common feature in virtue of which they are games, only that that isn't how our concept works; so if you come up with the feature, it wasn't needed' conflicts with what he actually wrote and also is a good deal less interesting."

I'm curious about who has offered the response you suggest.  It looks like such an obviously implausible and uninformed interpretation of Wittgenstein, I am surprised that it has even been suggested.  Of course, there are plenty of conflicting and questionable interpretations of W. in the literature, even among those published in reputable journals specializing in Wittgenstein.  (As I've already indicated, I think your interpretation of W. is an example.)  But the particular response you have indicated seems highly unlikely.  Any pointers would be appreciated.

Thanks,

Jason
Nov. 14, 2009

P.S.  I suppose it is commonly said that Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance rests on the examples of games and numbers, but one can find many other examples of its application in his Philosophical Investigations:  for example, with respect to knowing/understanding (paragraphs 143-155), reading (paragraphs 156 - 171), and being guided (172 - 180).  Wittgenstein may not offer these arguments to substantiate his notion of family resemblance, but they are clearly applications of that notion, and so any criticism of that notion should also take such applications into account.  Merely criticizing his discussion of games (or numbers) is not enough.  Though, for reasons I've already discussed in detail, I think your criticism of his discussion of games is unsuccessful.