From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Religion:

2009-11-19
A theory of religion
Reply to Jim Stone

In every religion I’ve read about, I found two poles:

  1. An esoteric pole for a select few high priests or wisemen who rely on complex teachings, intuitive rationality and metaphors (understood as metaphors) for understanding and “mystical” experience. This is an associated with an inward experience.
  2. An exoteric pole for the masses who rely primarily on simpler literal teachings and analogies (often taken as historical facts) for understanding and “religious” experience. These are generally based on #1, but are presented and experienced outwardly.

I think that this demarcation can be made in every religion. Some religions will dispute this saying that they are purely exoteric and that the teachings were written directly by their god(s) without human involvement. If you accept this, then that’s your business, but if you don’t then the esoteric side is, at the very least, those who contributed to the origins of that religion. But I think the esoteric-exoteric spectrum goes well beyond this least case.

I think that the term “religion” covers both of the two poles, but usually is describing pole #2 (“organized religion”). The failure to make this distinction results in much of the confusion in this thread. Every religious experience or outlook falls somewhere between these two poles. Oftentimes, the same text or oral tradition is designed to have two meanings simultaneously (an exoteric and an esoteric layer).

The many diversified beliefs (taken literally) of world religions found in the second pole can have little to do with each other and only have a “family resemblance”. The esoteric ideas of pole 1, however, have much in common across the world. I feel that Jim Stone’s original universal description of religion is better suited more narrowly for #1 above where many of the criticisms of this definition cite the term “religion” more closely associated with pole #2. The problem, of course, is that pole #1 aims for the ineffable, whether these ineffable truths are real or merely imagined, descriptions of them can fill many volumes but never reach completeness.

As one gets deeper and deeper into the ideas in pole #1, one finds congruency with the metaphysics that some philosophers practice. But, only those metaphysicists with a top down model of causality (or a non-causal ontological hierarchy). A reductionist’s bottom-up metaphysics has little to do with pole #1, but surprisingly can be congruent with pole #2 (with the exception of the existence of divinity[s]). Pole #1 is satisfied only through a top-down spiritual experience or belief that is deemed real, necessary or intuitive. Pole #2 can be satisfied with a contingent universe. For example: the universe is the way it is because god made it that way and that’s that.

Thus far, I have used a mostly sociological perspective, but this relates to philosophy as well which included religion discussions up until recent centuries. An example from the history of philosophy/theology to clarify the subtle difference between the two poles (in light of what is perceived to be necessary versus contingent truth) is to look at the famous Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Clarke (allegedly a proxy for Sir Isaac Newton) argued for a contingent metaphysics: Clarke/Newton’s god was the first actor in an equilibrium of absolute space-time. Leibniz argued for a necessary metaphysics: Leibniz’s god was the first rational decider among a disequilibrium of relative space-time. To Leibniz’s view, the alternative (Clarke’s god) made arbitrary (thus contingent) creative decisions.

Jim, I think that if you add this distinction (esoteric/necessary vs. exoteric/contingent) to your theory, you will avoid the present confusions. If you agree with me that this demarcation is useful, then to go much further than I have, I recommend Ralph Slotten’s Exoteric and Esoteric Modes of Apprehension for a 2-dimensional model (where mine is only a 1-dimensional spectrum). Slotten further divides “eso-exoteric (exoteric B, or tropological) and exo-esoteric (esoteric B or specular) readings or levels.”1 But Slotten’s new language is not merely intended to apprehend religion, but ambitiously, the whole of civilization.

Personally, I think “good art” covers both pole 1 and 2 where bad art only exists in pole 2. In this respect, one can make judgments on how good a religion’s “art” is thanks to this useful demarcation.

References:

1. Exoteric and Esoteric Modes of Apprehension, Ralph Slotten, Sociological Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 185-208 (article consists of 24 pages). Published by: Oxford University Press. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3709801