Kris, it seems that we could plausibly say that we ought to cultivate dispositions to treat animals in certain ways. e.g treat them as though they had rights for reasons that have nothing to do with the question of whether they have rights in the first place or not. i.e. we may want to cultivate various fortunate dispositions (which are in themselves, not fitting/ sensitive to the reasons/ rational). So, we could say that cultivating the disposition would in fact make it the case that we tended to do the right thing (e.g maximise animal's pleasure)  even though the specific wrong making feature of the action is not the fact that its "rights" was violated. In order to make the case that the animal, or the machine has rights, you must modify your claim to say that if an agent, who is fully informed and perfectly sensitive to all the reasons would in fact necessarily treat the machine or animal as if it had rights, then the machine or animal has rights.