Hi Philip,
you wrote:

How is this not judging continental philosophy by a standard that is alien to it. This is an external critique, it takes the standards of a certain intellectual praxis and applies them to another intellectual praxis without asking about the standards internal to the praxis that is being criticised. Now there is some room for this, but it is an extremely limited endeavor-

What you say in effect is against the possibility of all objective critique, because all such critique must be external and apply standards from one "intellectual praxis" to another. For example, if you were right, modern physical science could never have been in a position to criticize and reject Aristotelian cosmology because the latter had been "another intellectual praxis" too. Let me quote a passage from a paper by Herman Philipse to support my argument:

the preference for internal criticism, common in Continental philosophy, is both incoherent and an instance of the informal fallacy called argumentum ad Verecundiam (appeal to authority). It is incoherent because purely internal criticisms at best show that there are inconsistencies in an author, whereas the only reason for avoiding inconsistencies is that mutually inconsistent claims cannot all be true. Yet internal criticisms can never demonstrate which philosophical tenets are true or false. Hence the very point of internal criticisms, that is, the concern for truth, is frustrated if one restricts legitimate criticisms by fiat to internal ones. And the preference for internal criticism is an argumentum ad Verecundiam because it attaches importance to the identity of the author of criticisms instead of focusing on their validity.

 By the way, this is the same Herman Philipse who wrote the following in his book on Heidegger:

Most philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon world agree that critical discussion is one of the essential methods of clarifying and testing ideas. It seems, however, that on the European Continent, Heidegger's rhetorical move of denouncing critical discussion has been effective. Seen from a properly philosophical perspective, the influence of Martin Heidegger in European philosophy resembles the destructions of the Second World War on the Continent of Europe. The birthplace of the Enlightenment has been invaded by a revolutionary and yet reactionary power, which aims at replacing the open and critical mind of the Enlightenment by totalitarian and authoritarian thought.

I think what Philipse says about Heidegger applies to much of contemporary continental philosophy too.