Hi again, Jim.

I'll just quickly go over some of the problems with your definition, as I see it.

On the one hand, there are common games that do not seem to fall under your definition.  For example, the games we play with other people's hearts and minds.  But the main problem is that you throw the net too wide.  There are many activities that qualify as games by your definition, but that we do not call games. 

For example, rule-defined recreational activities, like going for a walk around the block five times (or going for a 20-minute walk).  The success state--having performed the activity--was not integral to the act of walking, and so was an arbitrary condition placed on that act; and the act was performed for one of your stated reasons:  recreation.  Yet, I don't think anybody would say that going for a 20-minute walk is playing a game. 

Furthermore, playing music in some common situations could qualify as a game by your definition.  For example, if I decide to improvise on a theme for ten minutes, I have placed a rule on my playing which defines an arbitrary success state.  I am doing so for recreation, entertainment, and/or to sharpen my skills.  This is a game by your definition, but I doubt anybody would call that activity a game. 

It also appears that telling some kinds of jokes qualify as playing games by your definition.  I will not repeat myself here, but only refer you to my account of the case of "why did the chicken cross the road?"

We could also question your definition on the grounds that it presumes we have non-family-resemblance conceptions of success states, arbitrary rules, recreation, entertainment, and the sharpening of skills.  In other words, it is not clear that you have not appealed to family-resemblance concepts in your attempt to define the term "game."

If you think any of the above involves a misunderstanding of your definition, I hope you will explain why.

As for Wittgenstein . . .

'Kindly note that “It should be just obvious that the proposed definition is what we mean by the word ‘game’” is not what I say, nor is it  implied by what I say. This condition for a plausible account is much stronger than anything I list. I agree that my account doesn’t satisfy it.'

Perhaps we disagree on what you must do to disprove Wittgenstein.  I think that, to successfully counter W., your definition must obviously be the one we have always had in mind--once it is understood, of course.  That is, once we grasp the correct application of your definition, we should not hesitate to accept that this is the way we have always used the word "game."  We should not require any additional evidence or argument to convince us.  Thus, as I said, it should just be obvious.  That is how I understand the situation, and I thought you did as well.  That is why I interpreted your use of the expression "seem intuitive" as I did.  If you meant "seem intuitive" to mean something else, I hope you don't mind explaining how it differs from what I have said.

It is interesting where you agree and disagree with W. on vagueness.  For, wouldn't you agree that the vagueness inherent in some of our concepts would naturally lead us towards divergent applications of them?  So that our application of those concepts does not itself constitute a well-defined set, but rather a set of entities which contain many overlapping commonalities? 

As Wittgenstein says (forgive me for not looking up the exact quote right now), when we see a blurry picture of somebody from far off, we do not correctly describe it by saying what they look like up close.  The point, I think, is that a well-defined rule does not accurately describe what our vague concepts look like.

You note that we are adept at triangulation, and that we can be clever in the way we are guided by commonalities.  But, if the concept is vague, as you seem to allow, then no clear definition will exactly indicate the concept we had previously been using.

Thus, your departure from W. is hard to understand.  It occurs here, when you say, " One test of the adequacy of the definition is that it will explain our ambivalence in such cases."  I don't see how that works.  Can a vague definition account for its own vagueness?

Finally, in your recent response to Luke Culpitt, you say, "If W says, You can't give a plausible account about games, look at them and you won't find any commonalities . . ."

I don't think W. says you cannot give a plausible account about games, though it depends on what you mean by "account."  In any case, he does not say you won't find any commonalities.  Rather, he says you will find commonalities, but not a unifying principle--not a single commonality running through the whole set.  He's quite explicit about that.



Regards,

Jason
Dec. 7, 2009