Hi Benj,

I'm mainly taking issue with (II), the claim that the procedure to ascertain what is presented in experience which you described is correct. First, I'm not clear on the procedure. What kind of concept applications are relevant? Surely not all concept tokenings correctly, rightly triggered by a G experience are relevant to what is represented in a G experience. For example, one is right to judge that something doesn't look yellow when one has a G experience of it, and one is also right to judge that it doesn't look purple. So one rightly has conceptual dispositions to token the concepts PURPLE and YELLOW when having G experiences. Obviously, it doesn't follow that G experiences represent yellow and purple (and this is clearly not a peculiarity of negative judgments). While I agree that Alva ought to have a disposition to token the concept RED as a result of having G experiences--namely, a disposition to judge that the cause of his experience is red--I don't think this fact indicates that his G experiences present things as red to him. Or at least I would like to know why you think it does.

I was also suggesting that the procedure you describe is not endorsed by representationalists, but this question is probably best left aside until the procedure has been clarified.