Please may I make a suggestion about science/philosophy distinction?
I am told that Newton, in the 1st edition of Principia, suggested that the phenomena described by his Law of Mass Attraction could be 'explained' if there were to be a 'force that acts at a distance', something that is invisible and unobservable in itself. He was criticised for entering the realm of metaphysics and making an inference that was not justified by any evidence (of the senses). Subsequently he wrote 'I have not as yet been able to discover the reason for these properties of gravity from phenomena, and I do not feign hypotheses (hypotheses non fingo). For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction'. (Wikipedia). It seems to that this encapsulates the distinction between 'experimental' philosophy (which we now call 'science'  - the observation of phenomena and the operation of inductive inference which does no more that summarise the observations made so far) and that branch of philosophy we call 'metaphysics' and which speculates about causal relations (or necessary connections) between phenomena. Science, as defined here, is never able to offer a categorical truth, because the very next observation of phenomena could undermine the consistency of previous observations - e.g. the discrepancy of Mercury's orbit that prompted Einstein's metaphysical hypothesis about the curvature of space/time and the theory of general relatively. (We might note that the discovery of an hitherto unobserved planet in the Solar System might reinstate Newton's Law again!).


So I advocate keeping apart the activities of making observations (experimental philosophy or 'science') and those that engage in speculations about the probabilities of causal relations and necessary connections i.e. 'metaphysics', embodied these days in (mathematical) modeling of hypothetical connections between observations. Keeping these two 'philosophies' apart - calling observations and measurement 'Science' and speculations about causal relations 'Metaphysics' would protect 'Science' and the whole body of knowledge (scientia) acquired by experiment from the effects of the inevitable changes in the causal (probabilistic) interpretations of the phenomena (metaphysics). 


Thus I can walk with confidence on the flat Earth, watch the Sun rise and set, the heavens rotate overhead and be entertained by the planets doing their weird motions without giving a thought to the varying curvature of the earth or the orbits of the planets and so on. And, without recourse to metaphysics, I can plumb the depths of knowledge required to navigate my ship or aeroplane using Great Circles to any part of the world or even to the Moon. I may be wrong, but I do not see any real need to seek causal explanations and I suggest that causal explanations are more a matter of 'fashion' within and between rival peer groups. Of course, people who want to change the course of events demand causal 'explanations' but, in the event of making decisions to take action, the 'explanations' are chosen to suit the political, economic aims of the decision makers rather than accord with the empirical 'facts'. Causal explanations are used as justification for action, just as the Will of God served the same purpose not so long ago.The little ice age, air pollution, global warming, weapons of mass destruction and so on - even printing money is thought to solve national bankruptcy and destroying towns and villages is believed to bring political freedom to the survivors! Heigh-ho fashions change!