2010-04-09
Describing zombies
Reply to Arnold Trehub
Hi Arnold

The problem here is essentially the same as I see with Stevan Harnad's approach. One is defining consciousness in terms of ideas which themselves seem - or may well be - inseparable from consciousness. Can one "experience" anything without consciousness? Can one have a "representation" of anything without consciousness? The answers are not self-evidently yes. So one would be defining something in terms of ideas which already contain - or may very well contain - that something.

Chalmers in fact tends to make matter worse (if possible) by defining a zombie as "a normal human being, but completely lacks conscious experience."  So here we get both "conscious" and "experience"...

I see all this as a classic example of philosophy chasing its tail. It is no wonder that after so many years of trying, with so many people involved, this areas of philosophy shows no sign of progress or anything resembling consensus.

DA