2010-04-17
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Describing zombies
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Hugh ChandlerUniversity of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
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Austen Clark, in 'Phenomenal Consciousness So-Called' writes: Ned Block introduced the technical sense of the term
"phenomenal consciousness" (or P-consciousness) in the
course of contrasting it with what he called "access
consciousness". Of course since it cannot be analyzed in terms of
functional or psychological notions, it is (regrettably) impossible to
give a definition, but one can at least list some synonyms and point
to examples. Block says:
P-consciousness is experience. P-conscious properties are experiential
ones. P-conscious states are experiential, that is, a state is
P-conscious if it has experiential properties. The totality of the
experiential properties of a state are "what it is like" to
have it. Moving from synonyms to examples, we have P-conscious states
when we see, hear, smell, taste, and have pains. P-conscious
properties include the experiential properties of sensations,
feelings, and perceptions, but I would also include thoughts, wants,
and emotions. (Block 1995, 230)
Suppose you experience the sight of a red patch or the smell of
something musty. The seeing and the smelling are then states of
phenomenal consciousness. Those states have a special kind of
property: experiential properties. The totality of those properties
define "what it is like" to have the experience-the seeing
or the smelling, respectively. Clark says the notion is 'laden with ambiguities'. (sec. 5 Post Mortem)
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