2010-05-12
Describing zombies
Reply to Hugh Chandler
Hugh

OK, let's accept that Chalmers is talking about something he calls "phenomenal consciousness". (I think the term is a bit of a pretentious furphy, but let that go).

But we are still faced with what he means by that. You write - I assume by way of answer:

"Sartre explores the inner experiential states (so to speak) of someone who is caught looking through the keyhole into someone else’s apartment. Intense embarrassment. Feels as though he is just a grotesque object rather than a person, etc etc. Sartre is exploring what it is like to be a human being – a person..... Surely anyone who sees any merit at all in this sort of stuff – phenomenology – cannot hold that there is nothing to it – that there is no such realm?"

I must confess to some surprise that Chalmers appeals to Sartre. Does he really?  But anyway, let's suppose that Sartre's analysis of how someone feels in such a moment is correct. (Actually one could react in other ways, depending on the kind of person one was, but let that pass.) 

But what does that tell us about consciousness - sorry "phenomenal" consciousness"?  Why should we equate this particular reaction with "phenomenal consciousness"? It is embarrassment certainly (or most probably), but why call embarrassment "phenomenal consciousness"?  I agree with you that one cannot hold that there is "nothing in this realm". But it would be quite arbitrary, surely, to assume that the something in question defines "phenomenal consciousness". Why choose embarrassment? Why not give a different case where someone is afraid and call fear "phenomenal consciousness"? Or hope? Or joy? Or sorrow? And so on.

Maybe Chalmers' is trying to say that "phenomenal consciousness" is all these reactions?  Embarrassment, fear, hope, joy, sorrow - all the emotions. But where would that leave us? Definition: "Phenomenal consciousness is all the human emotions".  But that brings us right back to the question-begging solution of equating consciousness - sorry "phenomenal consciousness" - with ideas like emotion, feeling, experience, awareness, etc.

If this is the key to Chalmers' definition of a zombie, he remains in very deep trouble.

DA

PS If I had the time I would read his book, but I don't - and I have to confess I don't have the inclination.