From PhilPapers forum Metaphysics:

2011-02-27
What about Idealism?
There is a curious statement made by Philonous to Hylas in George Berkeley's Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in the third dialogue.

Here is what Philonous says: "The question between the materialists and me is not, whether things have a real existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds."

I think we can modify this quote a little to say: The question between a materialist and an idealist is not, whether things have a real existence out of the mind of this or that human being, but whether have an existence outside of a mind.

The quote itself grants that there is a world exterior to the human mind that is either perceiving it, and this over looks the problem of an external world. However, why do we hold that there is a world that exists independent of a nonhuman mind?

Why should we believe that there is a world that exists independent of a mind instead of the world that exists is dependent on a mind?

I would agree that neither position is verifiable or refutable, and both accommodate our observations. However, we do know that minds exists and perceive things, so why should be believe that these things that we perceive (nonhuman objects like trees and etc) do exist outside of another mind?