From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Mind:

2011-05-18
That problem with Epiphenomenalism
Reply to Brian Crabb
Suppose I at last taste a mango and I experience the quale and I think to myself
occurrently that THIS is what tasting a mango is like!  That thought is caused in part
by experiencing the quale, which is caused in part by the quale itself. So the
quale is a cause of the thought; indeed, without it there would be no thought.
Does anybody seriously want to say that my thinking that occurrent thought
doesn't require neurological events in my brain? If it does, the quale is a cause
of them.

To deny that thinking occurent thoughts requires neurological events
is like denying the earth is spherical. If that's the price of epiphenomenalism,
as I take it to be, epiphenomenalism is a crazy view.  We know that thinking
involves neurological events.  Certainly there is vast empirical evidence that there is change of neurological state during occurrent thinking. A view that requires us
to jettison science doesn't make it to the starting line.

You characterize epiphenomenalism as a solution to the mind-body problem.
How is it that?

You say that other solutions are equally problematic. How? Not that they have
no difficulties! But generally they do not fly in the face of empirical science.