I’m not sure you can dismiss so easily the universal claim I see in Wittgenstein’s remark. I agree with Susanne that interpretation assumes a shared way of acting between the interpreter and those whose language is interpreted, and also that this does not entail that such a shared way of acting actually exists. Still, the fact you must assume it exists in interpreting makes it impossible to deny that it exists if you believe that there is something like successful interpretation. And my view is that this was Wittgenstein’s motivation for putting forward the universal claim. It’s a transcendental argument, isn’t it? There is interpretation; there can be no interpretation unless there’s a shared way of acting; ergo, there must be a shared way of acting (among all potential interpreters and all people potentially interpreted, i.e. among all people).

Now of course W. believed that there may be communities whose practices differ drastically from ours. His point, if I am right, is that they cannot differ to the point that nothing is left that resembles or is common to the human way of life – and that part of that form of life is given by language games. His universal claim leaves plenty of room for weird chess games and other strange stuff, but requests the existence of some game. Does this make sense to you?