2011-12-26
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Do zombies have intentional states about qualia?
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Derek AllanAustralian National University
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Hi Cecilea Thank you for your reply. I certainly recognise that, as you say, discussions about
zombies do occur. But discussions occur about all manner of things real and
unreal, so that in itself can’t be a reason why it is philosophically sensible to
carry on philosophical discussions about zombies. Frankly, philosophers talking
about zombies strikes me as the equivalent of the characters in the Big Bang Theory
arguing about what superman could or couldn’t do. In both cases Hollywood fantasies
are being taken seriously. Though at least Sheldon and his crew have the excuse
of being Hollywood fantasies themselves. I’m not quite sure what you mean by “your interpretation of Chalmers'
reliance on zombies”. I wasn’t interpreting Chalmers. That was a direct quote. I think you are right in saying that “zombies
are thought experiments that are supposed to incite our intuitions regarding
what consciousness is.” But there are two problems here: First, the term “experiment” is misleading. How
does one “experiment” with a Hollywood fantasy? Second, as I indicated, the idea of a zombie – such as it is
– is defined as a human being minus consciousness. If the idea of consciousness is necessary to
define a zombie, how could we use the idea of a zombie to help us define consciousness?
I don’t know whether the story about medieval philosophers debating
how many angels could pass through the eye of a needle is apocryphal or not.
But philosophical speculation about zombies strikes me as the modern-day equivalent. (Though the Middle Ages could perhaps be excused. They really did believe in angels...) DA
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