I would think it reasonably clear by now that I intend "ought" in a normative, viz. action-guiding sense.  But there are different kinds of action-guiding information, different kinds of "oughts."

A person's interests are the things the persons finds to be choiceworthy.  It's tautological that, if P finds A choiceworthy, then ceteris paribus P ought to choose A.  It is an empirical matter of fact whether or not P finds something choiceworthy; whether or not that thing actually gets chosen is a whole other ballgame.

So the "ought" of interest is "want to"; in contrast, the "ought" of morality is "have to."  The story of morality is how to get from "want to" to "have to."  I've already gone into that in some detail.  While the interest-ought is empirical, the moral-ought is rational:  it's a constraint imposed by requirement of rational justifiability.  As I've tried to spell out, this means you have to consider the interests of others equal to your own; nothing else can be legitimately defended.

If one isn't rational regarding resolutions of conflicts of interest, one cannot defend one's choices.  So we have an obligation in that others have the right to require/demand we be rational in that regard.

It's appropriate to cast moral-oughts as rules -- e.g., "Consider the interests of others equal to your own!"  But interest-oughts are not discovered as rules but rather as personal proclivities.  (As it were, they are more semantic than syntactic.)  They too can be expressed as rules, e.g. "Favor chocolate over other flavors!".  But when you discover you like chocolate, you don't discover you are following a rule; the rule comes later, if at all.

Moral-oughts, since they amount to constraints on interests, have the deontological aspect of duty and obligation.  This obligation is not "intersubjective" but objective:  It is an objective logical truth (I argue) that, if you want a rational basis for resolving conflicts of interest, then you have to regard everyone's interests as equal.  Interest-oughts don't have that aspect.

I hope this helps.