From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Mind:

2009-05-12
The 'Explanatory Gap'
Reply to Stevan Harnad
Hi Stevan

Re your comment: "As this transcription should illustrate, the change of vocabulary makes it clear that you are talking about differences in what humans and animals may be feeling, whereas what is at issue is whether they are feeling (anything at all)."

Not sure I'm happy with you changing everything to 'feels' etc. We are, after all, talking about consciousness and that's the term that the mainstream of this debate seems to use. In addition you have inserted the 'what's' in the second line which subtly alter the sense of what I wrote. The object of consciousness (or 'feeling') is quite irrelevant to the point I'm making. I am simply saying that one cannot assume that human and animal consciousnesses are the same (an elementary point, surely?). Issues about 'objects' or 'what's' have nothing to do with it.

You also write: "No. Reminding ourselves that we all (including animals) feel, and that, stones, (today's) robots -- and just about everything other than people and animals -- do not feel is not mere verbiage."

But I'm not making a point about reminding anyone of anything. I'm simply suggesting that comparing something to itself (as in the Nagel 'insight') is not likely to prove a very informative step.

DA