Cross-posted from http://mleseminar.wordpress.com/
...
My handout for the seminar yesterday is here – the paper we were discussing is here
(subscription required). We were glad to have Cian Dorr drop in for the
discussion – he really livened up what might have turned into an hour
and a half of Gonzalo teaching everybody about how truthmakers work!
My take on the contribution which Gonzalo’s paper makes to the
big-picture debate over truthmakers is as follows. Conceptions of
truthmaking which appeal only to entailment, or to necessitation, get
things importantly wrong. The way to fix up the account of truthmaking
is to appeal to a metaphysical ‘in virtue of’ relation. Truthmaking is
not mere sufficiency for the truth of a proposition. However, this
undermines much of the appeal that truthmaker theory had for some of
its original proponents – it does not, after all, allow us to avoid
primitive metaphysical ‘grounding’ or ‘dependence’ relations. Still, it
does not make truthmaker theory altogether useless – it just undermines
the idea that it is a panacea for all ills in foundational metaphysics.
With those general thoughts out of the way, here are a few more straightforward conclusions to come out of the discussion:
- The view that Gonzalo settles on has fairly strong commitments to
propositions. In the notation used in the paper,
,
, … all come out as distinct
propositions. This is because they can be made true in different ways –
take P to be ‘there is a chair’. Then my chair and your chair can make
true
jointly. My chair and your chair can make true
separately, but they can’t make it true jointly. Gonzalo
wants to underwrite this with a view of propositions as internally
structured entities.
- However,
,
,
… do not have
to be taken as distinct propositions for the account to go through.
This suggests a minimalist account of propositions compatible with
Gonzalo’s truthmaker account as follows: propositions are identical
iff, necessarily, they are made true by the same entities. So
,
, etc, come out as different names for a single
proposition, while
,
,
… come out as distinct propositions. Why might we be attracted to
this minimalist view of propositions? We might think we have a better
grip on existence, and on the ‘in virtue of’ relation, than we do of
that of a proposition. This view holds the promise of an explanatory
account of what a proposition is in terms only of truthmaking and
necessity.
- However, there are several pretty major problems with the
minimalist view. One is that, if we take the truthmaker for a=a to be a
itself, then the comes out as the same as ,
making a a necessary existent. Unless you’re Tim Williamson, this is a
bad result. Another problem is that all necessary falsehoods would come
out either as the same null proposition, or as not propositions at all
– none of them have any truthmakers. I’m still tempted by the view
though, and would be interested to hear any further objections to it.