| Question | Answer | Comments | |
| A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: no | A priori knowledge of the external world: no. | |
| Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Accept another alternative | Haven't thought deeply about the issue, but I think it ought to be decided on a case by case basis, according to the kind of abstract object. E.g., numbers might be reducible to sets, but sets might exist for Quinean reasons. | |
| Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Lean toward: subjective | | |
| Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Lean toward: yes | | |
| Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | | |
| External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Reject one, undecided between others | Fideistic realism: I cannot help being caused to believe that there is an external world, though I don't think there are good reasons for believing there is, i.e., good reasons for ruling out the Cartesian demon and suchlike. | |
| Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Lean toward: compatibilism | | |
| God: theism or atheism? | Lean toward: atheism | | |
| Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Lean toward: empiricism | | |
| Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
| Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Lean toward: non-Humean | | |
| Logic: classical or non-classical? | Lean toward: non-classical | | |
| Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Accept both | | |
| Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept: moral anti-realism | | |
| Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Accept: naturalism | Non-reductive naturalism. | |
| Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Accept: physicalism | In favor of non-reductive physicalism. | |
| Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept: non-cognitivism | | |
| Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
| Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
| Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Accept more than one | | |
| Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
| Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Lean toward: psychological view | | |
| Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Lean toward: egalitarianism | My political stance actually combines elements of all three... most importantly, though, I believe principles of justice must incorporate something like Rawls's difference principle. | |
| Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
| Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Accept: scientific realism | | |
| Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Lean toward: death | I believe psychological continuity is what matters in survival. But: the psychological continuity "preserved" by teleportation seems too tenuous and far removed from its normal biological cause (continuity of the brain), to warrant some skepticism as to the claim that psychological continuity is preserved. | |
| Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
| Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Lean toward: switch | I lean towards switching because I reject the squeamishness about getting one's hands dirty. That said, I don't believe there is an absolutely correct answer to this problem--it's a tragic choice, and one where deontological and consequentialist demands come into conflict. | |
| Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Accept an intermediate view | Must be decided on a case by case basis, depending on the domain of discourse. Something like Michael Lynch's pluralistic functionalist view seems plausible. | |
| Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
