Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen Lund University
Contact

Affiliations
  • Faculty, Lund University

Areas of specialization

Areas of interest

blank
About me
Not much to say..
My works
22 items found.
Sort by:
  1. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (forthcoming). Scott A. Davison, On the Intrinsic Value of Everything, Continuum, 2012. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2013). Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 28 (1):1-17.
    Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently, such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2011). Personal Value. Oxford University Press.
    This is a stimulating and vivid area of philosophical research, but it has tended to monopolize the notion of 'good-for', linking it necessarily to welfare or ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2011). Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact. In Sliwinski Rysiek & Svensson Frans (eds.), Neither/Nor - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday. Uppsala Philosophical Studies. 95 - 113.
    Reasons are facts, i.e., they are constituted by facts. Given a popular view that conceives of facts as thin abstract rather than thick concrete entities, the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons is not particularly problematic. It is argued that it would be preferable if we could understand the dichotomy even if we had a thick noton of fact in mind. It would be preferable because it is better if our notion of a reason is consistent with a wider rather (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2009). Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy. Philosophia 37 (2):227-243.
    The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2009). On for Someone's Sake Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397 - 411.
    Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us (rather than value simpliciter ), has recently been analysed in terms of so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers , which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone’s-sake attitudes can be (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2008). Love, Value and Supervenience. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):495-508.
    People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non?fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking this view as a starting point, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2007). Analysing Personal Value. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):405 - 435.
    It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too (and not only to impersonal values, which is the standard analysandum) if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake (where “favour” is a place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by the value bearer). One benefit (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (ed.) (2007). Homage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006). Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.
    The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only if its formulation (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006). Dislodging Butterflies From the Supervenient. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:103-112.
    Applied to evaluative properties the supervenience thesis is customarily understood as expressing two intuitions: (i) the idea that there is some kind of dependence between the (supervenient) value of an object and some (or all) of the natural properties of the object; (ii) the idea that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. It (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. W. Rabinowicz & T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (2005). Tropic of Value. In. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. 213--226.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2005). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. In. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. 115--129.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.) (2005). Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer.
    Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsic value has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such a way that all of the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004). Ett problem för Hares supervenienstes. SATS 5 (2):47-58.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004). Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care, Princeton Monographs in Philosophy, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. 135 Pp. [REVIEW] SATS 5 (1).
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Wlodek Rablnowlcz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003). Tropic of Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):389–403.
  18. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2002). Hedonism, Preferentialism, and Value Bearers. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):463-472.
  19. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2002). Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23 - 43.
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental value is a kind of value, then it (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). RM Hare, Sorting Out Ethics. Theoria 66 (3).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (1999). Particularism and Principles. Theoria 65 (2-3):114-126.
Is this list right?